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Abstract
We know that students are more optimistic about their performance after they 
take  a  test  that  progresses  from the  easiest  to  hardest  questions  than  after 
taking one that progresses in the opposite order . In fact, these “Easy-Hard” 1
students are more optimistic than “Hard-Easy” students even when the two 
groups  perform equally.  The  literature  explains  this  question  order  bias  as  a 
result of students’ failing to sufficiently adjust, in the face of new information, 
their extreme initial impressions about the test. In the first two of six studies, 
we investigated the possibility that a biased memory for individual questions 
on the test is an alternative mechanism driving the question order bias. The 
pattern  of  results  was  inconsistent  with  this  mechanism,  but  fit  with  the 
established  impression-based  mechanism.  In  the  next  four  studies,  we 
addressed the role that the number of test questions plays in determining the 
size  of  the  question order  bias,  discovered that  warning students  is  only  a 
partially effective method for reducing the bias, and established a more precise 
estimate of the bias’ size. Taken together, this work provides evidence that the 
question  order  bias  is  a  robust  phenomenon,  likely  driven  by  insufficient 
adjustment from extreme initial impressions.  
 Although the research in this thesis is my own, I conducted it in a lab and supervised a team 1
comprised of research assistants and honours students.  I  also received advice and direction 
from my supervisors. Therefore, I often use the word “we” in this thesis to reflect these facts.
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Chapter 1: Introducing the Question Order Bias 
Of all the emails that land in a teacher's inbox every semester, one of the 
most common reads something like, "Dear Professor, I just saw my grade on the 
test and I thought I had done much better than that. Can you check to see that it 
was scored correctly?” But almost inevitably, the test was scored correctly. So 
why do so many students leave tests  with such distorted views about their 
performance? There are many explanations for this phenomenon. Sometimes 
students overestimate because they hold unrealistic expectations based on their 
performance on previous tests—even when those tests are not related to the 
current one (Clayson, 2005; see Moore & Healy, 2008 for a review). Sometimes 
students  are  simply  incompetent—unable  to  know what  they  do  not  know 
(Dunning,  Johnson,  Ehrlinger,  &  Kruger,  2003;  Ehrlinger,  Johnson,  Banner, 
Dunning,  &  Kruger  2008;  Kennedy,  Lawton,  &  Plumlee,  2002;  Kruger  & 
Dunning, 1999). Sometimes the problem stems from the way students naturally 
form impressions about a test as they take it (Weinstein & Roediger, 2010, 2012). 
This  third  scenario  is  especially  likely  when the  questions  on  the  test  were 
arranged in order by difficulty. Students believe they did better on tests that 
progressed  from  easy  questions  to  difficult  questions  (Easy-Hard  tests) 
compared to tests that progressed in the opposite order (Hard-Easy tests) even 
when the tests contained the exact same questions (Feldman & Bernstein, 1977, 
1978;  Jackson & Greene,  2014;  Jones,  Rock,  Shaver,  Goethals,  & Ward,  1968; 
Weinstein & Roediger, 2010, 2012).
The  evidence  that  students  are  accurate  in  this  belief  is  mixed.  Until 
recently,  it  was  believed  that  Easy-Hard  tests  foster  a  slight—about  3%— 
advantage in performance over Hard-Easy tests (see Aamodt & McShane, 1992 
for  a  meta-analysis).  One  explanation  for  this  advantage  was  that  when 
students  begin  with  a  run  of  easy  questions  before  they  answer  the  hard 
questions, they have less anxiety and frustration. These reductions can translate 
to higher performance (Aamodt & McShane, 1992; Munz & Smouse, 1968; for a 
review, see Vander Schee, 2013). But newer evidence suggests any advantage in 
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performance produced by question order may even be smaller than previously 
suggested—perhaps so small as to be trivial (Vander Schee, 2013; Weinstein & 
Roediger, 2010, 2012). 
Regardless of any differences in actual performance on the test, students 
think they performed better when they took an Easy-Hard test compared to a 
Hard-Easy  test  (Feldman  &  Bernstein,  1977,  1978;  Jackson  &  Greene,  2014; 
Jones, et al., 1968; Weinstein & Roediger, 2010, 2012). This question order bias can 
be  found  even  when  experimenters  control  for  differences  in  actual 
performance on the two tests (Jackson & Greene, 2014; Weinstein & Roediger, 
2010, 2012). The most recent demonstrations show that the bias occurs across a 
variety  of  test  formats:  paper  and pencil,  digital,  multi-choice,  and/or  cued 
recall (Jackson & Greene, 2014; Weinstein & Roediger, 2010).
There is no single explanation for why the question order bias occurs, 
but  researchers  have  considered  several  candidate  mechanisms.  Without 
immediate feedback, there is no objective way for students to know how well 
they performed. So, they instead must rely on a different cue as a shortcut—or 
heuristic—to help them judge their performance. People rely on heuristics to 
make  a  wide  variety  of  judgements  (see  Alter  &  Oppenheimer,  2009  for  a 
review). For example, when information is easier to read, whether because it 
stands out in high contrast from the background or is written in clean, tidy font, 
people  inaccurately  judge  that  information  to  be  better  learned  than 
information that is difficult to read (Alter, Oppenheimer, Epley, & Eyre, 2007; 
Rhodes & Castel, 2008). Each candidate mechanism proposes students rely on a 
different cue to estimate their performance on a test.
Candidate Mechanism 1: Affect-as-Information, “I feel good about the test.”
One cue people may use is how good or bad they feel when they make 
the judgement.  For the purposes of this mechanism, affect  is  defined as “the 
specific quality of ‘goodness’ or ‘badness’ experienced as a feeling state (with or 
without consciousness)” (Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2007, p. 1333). 
It is possible that when students take tests ordered by difficulty, they experience 
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differing levels of positive and negative affect—particularly at the beginning of 
the test. Hard-Easy students may begin with more negative affect, and Easy-
Hard students may begin with more positive affect.  These initial  differences 
may translate to higher or lower estimates of performance at the end of the test. 
Generally,  people make more positive judgements about targets when 
they  experience  more  positive  affect  (for  a  review,  see  Clore  & Huntsinger, 
2007).  The  affect-as-information  theory  proposes  that  if  people  attribute  their 
affective state to the target being judged, their judgement will reflect that fact 
(Clore,  Wyer,  Dienes,  Gasper,  Gohm,  &  Isbell,  2001).  For  example,  people 
experiencing  high  positive  affect  often  judge  targets  to  be  more  honest, 
preferred, trustworthy, and more—even when the target was not the true source 
of people’s positive feelings (Slovic et al., 2007).
 Another judgement that could be influenced by how good or bad people 
feel is how well they performed on a test. Peoples’ initial affective response to a 
target can set the mood for the way they view subsequent interactions with it 
(Zajonc,  1980).  Students  who  take  a  Hard-Easy  test  (Hard-Easy  students) 
experience more difficulty and anxiety early on compared to those who take an 
Easy-Hard test (Easy-Hard students; Munz & Smouse, 1968). Those experiences 
result in more initial negative affect and lower overall performance (Hinze & 
Rapp, 2014). Once this “mood” of negativity is set, Hard-Easy students may not 
fully recover even when they begin to answer easier questions—the proverbial 
wind has been taken from their sails. As a result, Hard-Easy students end the 
test  with  more  negative  affect  than Easy-Hard students  and therefore  make 
more pessimistic estimates of their performance.
The  empirical  evidence  for  this  affect-driven  explanation  is  sparse.  If 
affect  plays  a  substantial  role  in  driving the  question order  bias,  we would 
expect  to  see  Hard-Easy  and Easy-Hard subjects  make affective  judgements 
about the test in ways that reflect a respectively negative or positive affect. One 
study asked subjects to rate their level of enjoyment throughout the test—an 
affective  judgement  (Weinstein  &  Roediger,  2012).  These  ratings  were 
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symmetrical regardless of question order and Hard-Easy subjects made higher 
ratings of overall  enjoyment by the end of the test  than Easy-Hard subjects. 
These findings suggest Hard-Easy subjects have no problem recovering from 
their initial experiences of difficulty and even their affective judgements are not 
biased by their initial affective experiences. It is therefore unlikely that affect 
drives the question order bias for judgements of performance either. 
There is a second feature of the question order bias inconsistent with an 
affective explanation: as mentioned previously, question order does not seem to 
change actual  performance.  If  the  question order  bias  is  driven by affective 
differences  between students  who take  opposite  orders  of  a  test,  we would 
expect  Hard-Easy  students  to  consistently  perform  better  than  Easy-Hard 
students. Recall that according to the affect-as-information hypothesis,  Hard-
Easy students would have more negative affect throughout the test than their 
Easy-Hard counterparts.  Negative affect  signals  a  threat  and people  tend to 
devote more cognitive resources to processing their environment so they can 
avoid any negative outcomes associated with the threat (see Clore, Schwarz, & 
Conway, 1994 for a review; Schwarz & Bless, 1991). In a testing situation, one 
negative  outcome  would  be  poor  performance.  If  Hard-Easy  students  exert 
more  effort  on  the  test  than  Easy-Hard  students,  they  should  also  perform 
better,  but  researchers  do  not  find  that  pattern  (Aamodt  &  McShane,  1992; 
Vander Schee, 2013; Weinstein & Roediger, 2010, 2012). It is therefore unlikely 
the question order bias is driven by differences in affect created by the order of 
test questions.
Candidate Mechanism 2: On-Line Impression Formation, “I think I did well.”
The  second  candidate  mechanism  proposes  students  rely  on  their 
impression about the ease or difficulty of the test to inform how well they think 
they performed overall, but this impression is biased by the difficulty of the first 
few test questions.
 People  form  impressions  about  nearly  anyone  and  anything  they 
encounter  (Ambady  &  Skowronski,  2008).  They  form  these  impressions  by 
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making  inferences  based on  interactions  with  or  information  about  a  target 
(Brown  &  Bassili,  2002;  Schaller,  2008;  Uleman  &  Kressel,  2013;  Winter  & 
Uleman, 1984). For example, if a stranger buys you fresh-squeezed orange juice 
when you are sad, you are highly likely to infer that she is a caring or kind 
person. These inferences can be made somewhat automatically and without the 
intention  or  even  the  awareness  of  the  observer  (Uleman,  Adil  Saribay,  & 
Gonzales, 2008).
Observers form impressions about targets during an interaction using a 
three-step process.  First,  a  given behavior (say,  someone buying you orange 
juice)  activates  a  relevant  trait  (say,  kindness).  Next,  an  associative  link  is 
formed  between  the  trait  and  the  target.  Finally,  the  observers  make  a 
dispositional  inference  about  the  target  based  on  the  trait  (the  person  who 
bought you orange juice is kind; Crawford, Skowronski, Stiff, & Scherer, 2007; 
Skowronski,  Carlton,  Mae,  &  Crawford,  1998).  Observers  often  use  their 
memory for that association, or inference, rather than a memory for the specific 
behavior from which it was formed, to make subsequent judgments about the 
target (the kind stranger is attractive)—especially when these links have been 
frequently re-visited and updated based on subsequent interactions (Carlston & 
Skowronski, 1986). Judgements based on such impressions are classified as on-
line judgement tasks under Hastie and Parks’ (1986) framework.
When observers have to incorporate more than one interaction with a 
target, they are notoriously bad at doing so accurately. Judgements based on 
these overall impressions tend to be biased towards the qualities suggested by 
observers’ first few interactions with the target(Anderson, 1965; 1973; Anderson 
&  Hubert,  1963;  Crano,  1977).  For  example,  one  study  showed  that  when 
subjects were given a list of a stranger’s traits that began favourably and ended 
unfavourably, they rated that stranger more positively than when the list was 
presented in  the  opposite  order  (Anderson & Barrios,  1961).  These  primacy 
effects for impression-related judgements can be found about events, strangers, 
products, legal evidence, and more (Anderson & Norman, 1964; Crano, 1977; 
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Hastie & Park, 1986; Mantonakis, Rodero, Lesschaeve, & Hschwaastie, 2009; see 
Hogarth & Einhorn, 1992 for a review). These effects arise because people do 
not  sufficiently  adjust  their  initial  impressions  about  a  target  to  account  for 
subsequent information.
There  are  two  main  explanations  for  why  people  do  not  adjust 
sufficiently (Crano, 1977). The first explanation shares many qualities with the 
affect-as-information hypothesis.  In  fact,  whether  a  target  causes  positive  or 
negative affect is sometimes part of what makes up people’s impression of the 
target itself  (Forgas & Bower, 1987).  Once people form an initial  impression, 
they interpret any subsequent ambiguous information to fit more closely with 
the  established context  (Asch,  1946;  Hamilton & Zanna,  1974;  Kaplan,  1971; 
Zanna,  &  Hamilton,  1977).  For  example,  in  one  study,  subjects  interpreted 
ambiguous descriptors of a stranger more positively when they had just seen a 
different, positive descriptor compared to when they had seen a negative one 
(Hamilton & Zanna, 1974).
The second explanation for  why people don’t  sufficiently adjust  from 
their initial impressions is analogous to a decline in or fatigue of attention to 
new stimuli over time. Once people have formed an initial impression based on 
preliminary interactions with a target, they give less weight to information from 
subsequent  interactions  (Belmore,  1987;  Feldman  &  Bernstein,  1977).  This 
attentional fatigue explanation differs from the previous one because it predicts 
that information encountered later in a sequence is attended to and influences 
the overall  impression less than early information, but later information still 
retains  its  original  meaning  (Crano,  1977).  This  mechanism  suggests 
manipulations  that  encourage  people  to  pay  more  attention  to  sufficient 
adjustment can reduce or eliminate the amount their judgements are biased by 
their initial impressions. Taken individually or together, these two explanations 
for insufficient adjustment demonstrate that early experiences with a target can 
guide and limit how people process subsequent experiences.
!  of !13 83
Thus,  when  people  need  to  make  a  judgement  based  on  an  overall 
impression formed from many interactions with a target, their judgements are 
often biased to reflect the qualities of the first few interactions. We can extend 
these ideas to account for the way students judge their performance on a test. 
Students’  initial  impressions  of  a  test  would  be  based  on  their  first  few 
interactions with it—its first few questions. This initial impression is accurate 
when the first few questions feel similar to the questions on the test as a whole. 
But when questions are arranged by difficulty, initial questions are extremely 
dissimilar  to  the  questions  on  the  test  as  a  whole.  Thus,  the  students’ 
impressions end up biased. Students’ initial impressions would instead begin at 
an extreme point (“This test is extremely easy/difficult”) that reflects only the 
way the test begins. Once students form this extreme initial impression, they 
might not sufficiently adjust it as they encounter new questions. By the end of 
the  test,  students  who  began  with  easy  questions  may  hold  an  overall 
impression  that  the  test  was  easier,  and  overestimate  their  performance 
accordingly, compared to those who began with difficult questions (Weinstein & 
Roediger,  2010,  2012).  In  other  words,  the  second  candidate  mechanism 
proposes Easy-Hard students mistakenly think they did better than Hard-Easy 
students  because  they  do  not  sufficiently  adjust  their  extreme  initial 
impressions.
Candidate Mechanism 3: A Memory-Based Strategy, “I remember easy 
questions.”
Candidate  Mechanism  2  proposes  students  use  a  cue  formed  on-line 
during the test (their impression of ease or difficulty) to help them judge their 
performance.  Candidate  Mechanism 3  proposes  students  instead judge their 
performance based on how well they think they performed on questions they 
can remember from the test. 
There  is  good  reason  to  expect  students  rely  on  their  memories  for 
individual questions as opposed to an overall impression of ease or difficulty to 
estimate their test performance. One factor that influences which cue people use 
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as a heuristic is the cue’s subjective validity for the judgement at hand (Shah & 
Oppenheimer, 2008). An abstracted impression of how easy or difficult the test 
was may not be the most valid cue for judging test performance. A more valid 
cue is something more directly related to performance. For example, how well 
do students think they performed on individual questions from the test?
To answer this question, students could attempt to recall every question 
on the test and tally the number they believe they answered correctly. Then, 
they could use that  tally to estimate their  performance.  This  attempt would 
result in the question order bias if students are better able to recall questions 
from the first half of the test than the second half.
Students could also adopt a similar strategy, but instead of exhaustively 
searching their memory for every test question, they could stop once they reach 
an internal criterion of what is sufficient to make their estimate (Simon, 1956). 
In other words, students may recall a few questions from the test, estimate their 
performance  on  those  questions,  and  use  that  estimate  to  inform  their 
judgement  of  overall  performance.  If  students  adopt  this  approach,  the 
questions that are most available for recall will heavily influence how well they 
believe they performed. This scenario is analogous to the use of an availability 
heuristic (Schwarz et al., 1991; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973).
The  availability  heuristic  is  simple:  if  it  is  easy  to  recall  examples  of 
something, people mistake that ease as evidence that there are many similar 
“somethings” in existence. For example, subjects incorrectly guessed that there 
are more words in the English language that begin with a letter such as “k, r, n, 
l, and v” than words that feature one of those letters as their third letter because 
it is easier to recall examples of the former (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973).
For the availability heuristic to explain the question order bias, students 
would need to find it disproportionally easy to remember examples of early test 
questions. This possibility might seem unlikely, because we know that people 
typically recall many more late items than early items from long lists—and tests 
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are often long lists of questions (Brown, Neath, & Chater, 2007; Murdock, 1962). 
Still, it remains an empirical question. 
Both the exhaustive recall and availability heuristic approaches would be 
classified as  memory-based judgement  tasks under Hastie  and Park’s  (1986) 
framework.  Experiments  1a-d  and  2  investigate  the  extent  to  which  such  a 
memory-based approach drives the question order bias.  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Chapter 2: Investigating the Memory for Questions Mechanism
Hastie  and  Park’s  (1986)  on-line  vs  memory-based  judgement  task 
framework predicts that when people make judgements about a target using a 
memory-based  strategy,  there  should  be  a  close  relationship  between  the 
specific interactions with the target people can recall and the qualities of the 
judgements people make. For example, the more positive interactions people 
can recall  about a  person,  the more positively that  person will  be rated.  By 
contrast, when people use an on-line strategy, no such relationship is predicted.
In  Experiments  1a-d,  we investigate  the  evidence  that  students  use  a 
memory-based strategy to estimate their test performance. To do so, we find out 
which questions students can recall after taking either an Easy-Hard or a Hard-
Easy test. If students use a memory-based strategy, we would expect them to be 
better able to recall early test questions than later test questions because Easy-
Hard students are typically more optimistic about their performance than their 
Hard-Easy counterparts. 
As  the  primary  aim  of  this  experiment  was  to  investigate  which 
questions are easiest for people to recall from a test arranged by difficulty, we 
did  not  measure  subjects’  actual  performance  nor  take  a  measure  of  their 
estimated performance.
Experiments 1a-d
Method
Designs.  Across  Experiments  1a-d,  we used a  2  group (Test  question 
order: Easy-Hard, Hard-Easy) between subjects design.
Subjects. For all experiments in this thesis, we used Amazon's 
Mechanical Turk (MTurk; https://www.mturk.com/mturk/welcome) to recruit 
English-speaking subjects . We recruited 76 people to participate in Experiment 2
 Mechanical Turk is an online subject pool. MTurk subjects complete experiments and surveys 2
and  are  given  small  amounts  of  Amazon  credit  that  they  can  use  to  purchase  things  on 
Amazon.com. These subjects are diverse and the data from studies run online using MTurk 
often  produces  similar  results  to  those  run  in  a  laboratory  or  with  other  online  subjects 
(Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011; Germine et al., 2012; Mason & Suri, 2011). 
!  of !17 83
1a; 43 in Experiment 1b; 54 in Experiment 1c, and 67 in Experiment 1d for 
$0.50 .3
Procedures.  These experiments had two phases. In the first phase, we 
told subjects: 
For this HIT , you will be answering 50 general knowledge questions at 4
your own pace. Your aim is to maximise the number of correct responses 
you give. Please answer each question from your own memory. Avoid 
searching  for  the  answers  on  the  internet  or  other  external  sources. 
Please enter an answer for each question. If you do not know the answer, 
please enter a plausible guess. 
Next, subjects took a 50 question trivia test . For all experiments in this paper, 5
we used the same trivia tests as Weinstein and Roediger (2010; see also Nelson 
& Narens, 1980) . We asked subjects to take tests that contained 50 questions, 6
arranged by difficulty. Questions that many people tended to answer correctly 
(according to the Nelson & Narens norms) were considered easy, and questions 
that many people tended to answer incorrectly were considered difficult. In the 
norms,  approximately  97.40%  of  people  answered  the  easiest  questions 
correctly, and fewer than .004% answered the most difficult questions correctly. 
Each test was arranged in order from the easiest to the hardest or vice versa.
After subjects answered the last question, the second phase began. In this 
phase,  all  subjects  performed  the  same  recall  task,  but  with  four  small 
variations. In Experiments 1a-d, we told subjects 
 Across experiments 1a-d,  one hundred and thirty two people did not complete the entire 3
experiment and we therefore did not include them in our data analyses.
 A Human Intelligence Task (HIT) is a term used on MTurk to refer to a voluntary task such as 4
these psychology studies.
 For all experiments in this thesis except Experiment 3, subjects took one of two versions of the 5
trivia test. These versions were counterbalanced across subjects. See Appendix A for the full 
versions of both tests.
 There  is  now  an  updated  version  of  these  norms  published  (Tauber,  Dunlosky,  Rawson, 6
Rhodes, & Sitzman, 2013).
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You were asked a total of 50 trivia questions. We need to know which 
questions you can remember, so now your task is to try to recall as many 
questions as you can. We are not interested in the exact wording of each 
question—just type enough so that we know which particular question 
you are remembering. You DO NOT have to recall the questions in the 
order they were presented. 
In  Experiment  1b,  for  each  question  they  recalled,  subjects  rated  their 
confidence that they had answered it  correctly on the test.  They made these 
ratings using a Likert scale from 1 (not at all confident) to 5 (very confident). In 
Experiment 1c, we offered subjects an incentive for recalling a large number of 
questions—double their compensation. In Experiment 1d, subjects received the 
same instructions as in Experiments 1b and 1c combined. Subjects then reported 
all the questions they could recall . 7
Instructional  manipulation  check  and  compliance  check.  For  all 
experiments in this  thesis,  after  the experiment proper concluded,  we asked 
subjects to respond to a series of questions designed to identify those who were 
not taking the task seriously, as well as those who had not complied with the 
instructions. Because the proposed mechanisms that underly the question order 
bias are heavily dependent on people’s interactions with a target, we excluded 
subjects  who  did  not  pass  these  checks  to  ensure  that  each  subject  was 
genuinely trying to take the test. For all experiments, when these subjects were 
included  in  our  analyses,  the  patterns  of  our  results  remained  similar,  but 
(unsurprisingly) p-values and confidence intervals varied. 
To  identify  people  who  did  not  take  the  test  seriously,  we  used  an 
Instructional Manipulation Check (Downs, Holbrook, Sheng, & Cranor, 2010; 
Oppenheimer,  Meyvis,  &  Davidenko,  2009)—a  paragraph  about  the  2012 
Olympic games that ends with the sentence, "Which city will  be hosting the 
 For our analyses on confidence ratings in Experiments 1b and 1d, see Appendix D.7
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2012 Summer Olympic Games?" followed by 10 cities as options . Embedded in 8
the paragraph was this sentence: “This question is included to make sure you 
are paying attention to the study. Please disregard the rest of this paragraph and 
choose the third option.” The third option was "Shanghai." Only those subjects 
who chose the third option were included in our analyses.
 To identify subjects who did not comply with the instructions, we told 
them: 
We are interested in response times and patterns of responses between 
individuals  who  answered  the  previous  questions  using  their  own 
knowledge  and  those  who  looked  up  the  answers  using  an  external 
source. Regardless of your strategy, you will be paid for this HIT. Please 
indicate your strategy below. 
Choices were "I answered each question from my own memory", "I answered 
most questions from my own memory, but I consulted an external source for at 
least  one  question",  "I  answered  about  half  of  the  questions  from  my  own 
memory", "I answered most questions using an external source, but used my 
own memory for at least one question", and "I answered each question using an 
external source." Only subjects who chose "I answered each question from my 
own memory" were included in our analyses.
Results and Discussion
We excluded 27 (36%) subjects in Experiment 1a, 13 (24%) in Experiment 
1b, seven (13%) in Experiment 1c, and 11 (16%) in Experiment 1d for failing the 
IMC and/or indicating that they consulted an external source for at least one 
question. For all experiments in this thesis, our exclusion rates are comparable, 
if not, lower than those found by Oppenheimer et al. (2009). After exclusions, 49 
subjects  remained  in  Experiment  1a,  30  remained  in  Experiment  1b,  47 
 For studies that were conducted after 2012, the question was modified to “Which country 8
hosted the 2012 Summer Olympic Games?”
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remained in Experiment 1c, and 56 remained in Experiment 1d . See Appendix 9
E for details about demographics.
Number  of  questions  recalled.  In  addition  to  analysing  the  serial 
position of each question subjects recalled, we also measured the total number 
of questions subjects recalled. Across all experiments, there was a very small 
trend for  Easy-Hard subjects  to  recall  fewer  questions  than their  Hard-Easy 
counterparts. The individual trends for each study are shown in Table 1. A close 
inspection of Figures 1a-d show that this overall trend was concentrated around 
questions that appeared in roughly the first half of the test.
Serial positions. We now turn to the primary issue: did people report 
more questions from the beginning of the test than from any other part of the 
test? If so, a memory-based strategy might explain the question order bias. To 
address this issue, we asked a research assistant, blind to condition, to identify 
the serial position of each question subjects recalled. Contrary to the memory-
based strategy hypothesis, people recalled more questions not from the 
beginning of the test, but from the end. This pattern was consistent regardless 
of test order, incentive, and whether subjects rated their confidence that they 
answered those questions correctly on the test (Figures 1a-d). In null-hypothesis 
Table 1. Experiments 1a-d, the mean number of questions 
subjects recalled from their tests.
Experiment Question Order Mean (SD) 95% CIdiff
1a Easy-Hard 13.64 (8.02) [-3.09, 6.77]
Hard-Easy 15.48 (9.06)
1b Easy-Hard 13.00 (9.96) [-0.74, 11.74]
Hard-Easy 18.50 (6.57)
1c Easy-Hard 16.38 (10.68) [-2.95, 9.85]
Hard-Easy 19.83 (11.11)
1d Easy-Hard 12.55 (9.80) [0.64, 11.66]
Hard-Easy 18.70 (10.55)
 The pattern of exclusions did not vary depending on test order for any of Experiments 1a-d, all 9
p’s > 0.10.
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significance-testing (NHST) terms, for each of Experiments 1a-d, we found 
significant one-way Repeated-Measures ANOVAs on the mean number of 
questions subjects recalled from each 5-question block of the test,1a: F(9, 490) = 
5.55, p < 0.01, 1b: F(9, 290) = 2.53, p < 0.01, 1d: F(9, 550) = 2.04, p = 0.04, 1c: F(9, 
460) = 2.19, p = 0.02, 1d: F(9, 550) = 2.53, p < 0.01 .10
This pattern of recall by serial position provides an explanation for why 
Hard-Easy subjects  showed a  consistent  trend to  recall  more questions than 
 We also ran a version of Experiment 1a in which subjects estimated their performance after 10
recalling five questions from anywhere on the test. This study is referred to as “Franco & Garry, 
Availability” in the mini meta-analysis reported later in this thesis. We found the same pattern 
of recall as in Experiments 1a-d, that is, subjects recalled more questions from the end of the test 
than from the beginning, regardless of question order. 
Figures 1a-d. Mean number of questions recalled in each block of 5 questions on the test by 
serial position.
A. Experiment 1a: Block 1—Easy-Hard (M=1.11, SD=0.96), Hard-Easy (M=1.33, SD=1.32)
  Block 10—Easy-Hard (M=2.50, SD=1.40), Hard-Easy (M=2.52, SD=1.40)
B. Experiment 1b: Block 1—Easy-Hard (M=1.06, SD=1.06), Hard-Easy (M=1.92, SD=1.00)
  Block 10— Easy-Hard (M=2.17, SD=1.20), Hard-Easy (M=2.50, SD=0.67)
C. Experiment 1c: Block 1—Easy-Hard (M=1.38, SD=1.17), Hard-Easy (M=2.13, SD=1.17)
  Block 10—Easy-Hard (M=2.17, SD=1.49), Hard-Easy (M=2.78, SD=1.35)
D. Experiment 1d: Block 1—Easy-Hard (M=0.94, SD=1.09), Hard-Easy (M=1.70, SD=1.52)
  Block 10—Easy-Hard (M=1.88, SD=1.73), Hard-Easy (M=2.48, SD=1.34)
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Easy-Hard subjects. Subjects likely spent more time and effort processing the 
hard questions than the easy questions. These memory-aiding resources may 
have helped Hard-Easy subjects more easily recall questions from the beginning 
of the test (Craik & Lockart, 1972; Johnston & Uhl, 1976). By contrast, the hard 
questions were already relatively available for recall in the Easy-Hard group 
because  they  were  seen  very  recently,  so  Easy-Hard  subjects  may  not  have 
received the same boost in overall number of questions recalled.
At first glance, the data across Experiments 1a-d do not fit with the idea 
that students use their  memory for individual test  questions to inform their 
global estimates of performance. There is no evidence that subjects could better 
recall questions from the beginning of the test than those from the end. But the 
previous analyses only considered what students would recall if their search 
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Figures 2a-d. Mean number of questions recalled in each block of 5 questions on the 
test by serial position—separated to depict the first five questions reported by each 
subject, the second five, and the third five.
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was exhaustive. As previously mentioned, students may take a shortcut and 
adopt an approach similar to the availability heuristic instead. This approach 
would be biased by the questions that are the most available for recall (Tversky 
& Kahneman, 1973). We would find evidence for this memory-based strategy if 
questions from the beginning of the test were more available than those from 
the end.
 In order to investigate this possibility, we constrained our analyses to 
the first few questions subjects reported—assuming those questions were the 
ones that sprung to mind most easily. As Figures 2a-d make abundantly clear, 
subjects tended to report recent items first. In fact, as Table 2 shows, the very 
last question was reported first more frequently than both the first and second 
questions combined in Experiments 1a-d. It is therefore unlikely the question 
order bias is driven by students’ memory for the individual questions on the 
test.  Instead,  the  most  likely  explanation  remains  Candidate  Mechanism  2: 
students insufficiently adjust from their initial impressions about the test and 
rely on those impressions to make their estimates of overall performance.
Recent  test  questions  may  have  been  especially  available  for  several 
reasons, but two are especially likely in this scenario. First, recency effects are 
pervasive in free-recall  scenarios (Baddeley, Eysenk, & Anderson, 2009).  It  is 
easier to temporally discriminate recent items from their antecedents, much like 
nearer telephone posts are easier to discriminate spatially than those that are 
further away (Crowder, 1976). Second, as is typical in free recall scenarios with 
an impression formation component, subjects may have preferentially encoded 
experiences that were inconsistent with their impressions, but did not assign 
those experiences extra weight when adjusting their impression (for a review, 
see Hastie, 1980).
Our data show that people are good at recalling recent test  questions 
when  we  ask  them to  recall  as  many  questions  as  they  can—in  fact,  those 
questions are often the first people report. Perhaps, then, asking people to recall 
the last few questions from the test before estimating their performance would 
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increase the salience of these questions. When cognitive feelings such as ease of 
retrieval are highly salient, people are more likely to use them when making 
ambiguous  judgements  such  as  estimating  performance  on  a  test  (Kühnen, 
2010; see Greifeneder, Bless, & Pham, 2010 for a review). If we increase people’s 
use of questions that are easily recalled (recent questions) we should reduce 
people’s use of their impressions to estimate their performance. This reduction 
could produce the opposite of the typical question-order bias.  That is,  Easy-
Hard test takers would be more pessimistic about their performance than Hard-
Easy test takers. We address this possibility in Experiment 2.
Table 2. Experiments 1a-d proportion of subjects who reported the initial, second and 
final test questions first
Serial Position
Experiment Test Order Initial 
Question
Second 
Question
Final 
Question
1a Easy-Hard 0.11 0.00 0.46
Hard-Easy 0.00 0.00 0.48
1b Easy-Hard 0.11 0.00 0.22
Hard-Easy 0.08 0.00 0.25
1c Easy-Hard 0.00 0.00 0.29
Hard-Easy 0.04 0.00 0.35
1d Easy-Hard 0.03 0.00 0.24
Hard-Easy 0.04 0.00 0.33
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Experiment 2
Method
Design. We used a 2 (Test question order: Easy-Hard, Hard-Easy) X 2 
(Recall: Yes, No) between subjects design.
Subjects. Based on the results of a previous study (reported in Chapter 5 
as Franco & Garry: MTurk Replication, p. 46) and our expected exclusion rates, 
we aimed to collect 560 subjects—140 subjects for each between subjects cell. 
Due  to  the  way  our  survey  platforms  (MTurk  and  Qualtrics)  interact,  it  is 
possible to collect more subjects than requested. Because of this fact, this and all 
subsequent  experiments  have  Ns  that  deviate  slightly  from  our  intended 
sample sizes. For this study, we recruited 564 people on MTurk to participate 
for $0.50 .11
Materials  and  procedure.  The  procedure  for  Experiment  2  matched 
those of Experiment 1a with three exceptions. First, directly after the test, we 
instructed half of subjects to recall and write down only the last five questions 
they saw and the other half simply skipped the recall phase. Second, all subjects 
then estimated the number of questions they answered correctly on the entire 
test. Third, after estimating performance, subjects answered the question, "Did 
you  notice  anything  in  particular  about  the  way  that  the  questions  were 
arranged  on  the  trivia  test  you  just  took?"  If  anyone  answered  "yes"  they 
elaborated on what they noticed.
Results and Discussion
We excluded 119 (21%) subjects were excluded for failing the IMC and/
or reporting that they consulted an external source for at least one question on 
the test . After exclusions, 445 subjects remained. See Appendix E for details 12
about demographic information.
 Ninety nine people did not complete the entire experiment and we therefore did not include 11
them in our data analyses.
 The pattern of exclusions did not vary depending on test order X2 (1, N = 119) = 0.09, p = 0.99.12
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Scoring  criteria.  Questions  on  the  test  were  scored  according  to  a 
formula. If the first three letters of a subject's answer matched the first three 
letters of the correct answer (as indicated by the Nelson & Narens, 1980 norms), 
the question was scored as correct. For example, for the question "What is the 
name of the comic strip character who eats spinach to increase his strength?” 
“Popeye” was the correct answer. Answers that began with "Pop" were scored 
as  correct.  In  a  few  cases,  there  were  common  misspellings  or  alternative 
spellings in the first three letters of an answer. For these questions, we included 
the misspellings and alternative spellings in our formula. For example, for the 
question  "What  is  the  name  of  the  Chinese  religion  founded  by  Lao  Tse?” 
“Taoism”  and  “Daoism”  are  both  correct  answers.  Therefore,  answers  that 
began with "Tao" or "Dao" were scored as correct.
Number of correct answers. Before turning to our primary question, we 
first  calculated  subjects’  actual  performance.  We  replicated  Weinstein  and 
Roediger’s (2010, 2012) finding that subjects performed similarly, regardless of 
whether they took the Easy-Hard (M = 56.16%, SD = 15.58) or Hard-Easy (M = 
58.22%, SD = 15.96) test, Mdiff = 2.06%, 95% CI [-0.86, 5.00]. In addition, subjects 
who  recalled  five  questions  before  they  estimated  their  performance  (M  = 
59.20%,  SD = 15.14)  answered a  mean of  4% more  questions  correctly  than 
subjects who did not (M = 55.20%, SD = 16.16), 95% CI [1.08, 6.92]. This second 
result  was  surprising  because  the  recall  task  only  came  after  the  test  was 
completed and therefore could not have affected people’s  performance.  This 
difference in mean performance held no influence over how biased people’s 
estimates  about  their  performance  were  because  we  corrected  people’s 
estimates to account for individual performance.
Question order bias.  For these and many subsequent analyses in this 
thesis,  we must consider how best to frame the effects of question order on 
people’s estimates of performance. On the one hand, we could say that people 
who  take  Easy-Hard  tests  are  optimistic  because  their  mean  estimates  are 
higher than their actual mean performance (Weinstein & Roediger, 2010; 2012). 
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But  the  problem with  using actual  performance  as  a  reference  point  is  that 
performance often depends on arbitrary criteria set by the person who marks 
the test (see Weinstein & Roediger 2010). 
On the other hand, we could say that people who take Easy-Hard tests 
are optimistic compared to some “status quo” benchmark such as a randomly-
ordered test. But such an approach comes with its own problems. First, there is 
no  evidence  that  randomly-ordered  tests  are  the  norm  among  real-life 
educators.  Second, there is no guarantee that a single randomly-ordered test 
begins  with  questions  that  are  representative  of  the  test’s  entire  range  of 
difficulty. In fact, it is plausible that such a test could end up being arranged 
identically to an Easy-Hard or a Hard-Easy test. To limit these problems and to 
be  consistent  with  previous  research  (Weinstein  &  Roediger,  2012),  we 
interpreted  opposite  test  orders  relative  to  each  other,  comparing  people’s 
estimates after an Easy-Hard test with others’ estimates after a Hard-Easy test. 
Also consistent with Weinstein & Roediger’s (2010, 2012) approach, we 
corrected  these  estimates  for  subjects’  actual  performance.  We  did  so  by 
subtracting the number of questions each subject actually answered correctly 
from  the  number  they  estimated  they  answered  correctly.  This  correction 
resulted  in  a  difference  score  that  we  refer  to  as  a  bias  score.  Subjects  who 
overestimated their  performance received a  positive  bias  score,  and subjects 
who  underestimated  received  a  negative  bias  score.  We  performed  this 
correction to account for any differences in actual  test  performance between 
groups .13
Did calling attention to the last few questions on the test change the way 
people  estimated  their  performance?  If  so,  we  should  have  led  Hard-Easy 
subjects  to  overestimate  and  Easy-Hard  subjects  to  underestimate.  But  that 
pattern is  not what we found. The question order bias was equally as large 
 An  alternative  method  of  correcting  for  individual  performance  is  to  measure  subjects’ 13
performance estimates and include their actual performance in the model as a covariate with 
Test Order and Recall. We conducted these analyses for Experiments 2, 3, and 4 and found the 
same patterns of results described in the main text.
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regardless  of  whether subjects  recalled test  questions before estimating their 
overall performance (see Figure 3). In fact, recalling questions before estimating 
performance  simply  made  everyone  more  pessimistic  regardless  of  test 
question order, Mdiff  = 3.86%, 95% CI [1.40, 6.34]. In NHST terms, there were 
main effects of Recall and Test question order, F(1, 443) = 9.46, p < 0.01 and F(1, 
443) = 78.37, p < 0.01, respectively, but no significant interaction F(3, 441) = 1.67, 
p = 0.20. Taken together, these findings show that drawing subjects’ attention to 
the last few questions on the test before they estimated their performance only 
trivially affected the size of the question order bias.
Subjects who noticed the arrangement of their test questions. A critic 
might wonder if the question order bias depends on whether or not students 
are aware that the test is arranged by difficulty. Perhaps if people were aware of 
how the test  was arranged at  the time of estimation,  they would be able to 
account for this potential source of bias and make an accurate estimate of their 
performance. We did not forewarn any of our subjects about the arrangement of 
Figure  3.  The  mean  difference,  in  percentage,  between  the  number  of  questions  people 
estimated  they  answered  correctly  and  the  actual  number  of  questions  they  answered 
correctly. Inset axes: The mean size of the question order bias, between people who recalled 
five questions before estimating and people who did not. All error bars represent 95% CIs for 
each cell mean. 
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the tests in this study, but 93 subjects (21%) accurately reported noticing that 
their test was arranged by difficulty. Forty-five subjects had taken a test that 
began with easy questions and 48 had taken a test  that began with difficult 
questions. When subjects noticed that the test was arranged by difficulty, they 
were similarly biased compared to those who did not report noticing the test 
was arranged by difficulty, F(1, 443) = 1.84, p = 0.18. Reporting having noticed 
the question order did not interact with whether or not subjects were asked to 
recall five questions before estimating their performance, F < 1. In addition, the 
three-way  interaction  between  recall,  question  order,  and  whether  subjects 
reported noticing the question order was nonsignificant, F < 1. 
But  subjects  who  accurately  reported  noticing  that  their  test  was 
arranged  by  difficulty  made  more  pessimistic  performance  estimates  than 
subjects who did not report noticing the way their test was arranged, Mdiff  = 
4.10%, 95% CI [1.06, 7.16]. In NHST terms, subjects who reported noticing the 
way their test was arranged made significantly more pessimistic performance 
estimates (M = -2.04%, SD = 12.84) than subjects who did not report noticing the 
way their test was arranged (M = 2.20%, SD = 15.76), F(1, 443) = 7.02, p = 0.01. 
Perhaps  these  subjects  held  a  naïve  theory  that  when a  test  is  arranged by 
difficulty, regardless of whether the difficulty ascends or descends throughout 
the test, that test becomes more difficult overall.
Accuracy of recall.  The task of correctly recalling each of the last five 
questions on the test proved to be difficult. Easy-Hard subjects recalled a mean 
of  53% (SD = 21%) of  the last  five questions from their  test  and Hard-Easy 
subjects recalled 56% (SD = 20%), Mdiff = 3% , 95% CI [-9%, 2%]. In NHST terms, 
these two means did not differ significantly t(220) = 1.97, p = 0.23. This difficulty 
could  possibly  explain  why  subjects  in  the  Recall  condition  made  more 
pessimistic estimates than subjects in the No Recall condition. Perhaps subjects 
misattributed  their  experience  of  retrieval  difficulty  as  informative  to  their 
estimate of performance, as people tend to do for judgments of frequency and 
confidence (see Alter & Oppenheimer, 2009). 
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One alternative explanation for our results is that not enough subjects 
could correctly constrain their recall to only the questions from the end of their 
tests. If this scenario is true, our manipulation might not have made the end of 
the  test  sufficiently  salient  to  reduce  subjects’  reliance  on  their  initial 
impressions. We tested this possibility by determining whether subjects who 
were better at constraining their recall to questions from the end of their test 
had less-extreme bias scores than those who were poor at constraining their 
recall. We ran an ANCOVA with bias scores as the dependent variable, the order 
of test questions as a between-subjects factor, and the percentage of questions 
that subjects correctly recalled from the last block of the test as a covariate. We 
found no evidence  to  support  this  alternative  explanation.  Those  who were 
better and those who were worse at constraining their recall to questions from 
the end of the test showed no systematic differences in the magnitude of their 
bias scores regardless of test order, F(3, 218) = 2.17, p = 0.14. In addition, the 
percentage of questions subjects correctly recalled from the end of their tests 
had no main effect on bias scores either, F(1, 220) < 1.
Spontaneous  discounting  of  availability.  Some  of  the  results  from 
Experiments 1a-d and 2 open the door to another memory-based explanation 
for the question order bias.  Consider the fact that Experiments 1a-d showed 
there was a clear trend for subjects to recall the most recent test questions first. 
In other words, these questions were likely to be the most available for recall. 
Students might know those questions are only easy to recall because of their 
recency,  not  their  frequency  of  occurrence.  This  knowledge  could  cause 
students to spontaneously discount the availability of recent test questions and 
over-correct  their  estimates  of  performance (Oppenheimer,  2004).  In  general, 
when people can attribute the availability of exemplars to a source unrelated to 
the judgement they are making, they don’t use that availability to inform the 
judgement (Schwarz et al., 1991). If students realise certain questions are only 
highly available due to their recency, they might discount the information those 
questions would provide for an availability heuristic. Depending on whether 
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the questions being discounted are easy or difficult, students would then make 
correspondingly pessimistic or optimistic estimates of performance on the test 
as a whole.
But  one  result  from Experiment  2  does  not  fit  with  this  spontaneous 
discounting  explanation.  If  students  over-correct  their  estimates  when  they 
discount the availability of  recent test  questions,  we should have seen more 
subjects over-correct when the source of that availability is made even more 
salient. As a result, the question order bias should have been larger for subjects 
whom  we  instructed  to  recall  the  last  5  questions  on  the  test  before  they 
estimated  their  overall  performance.  But  we  did  not  find  that  pattern. 
Therefore,  the  question  order  bias  is  unlikely  to  be  caused  by  students 
spontaneously discounting the availability of recent test questions.
Summary of Experiments 1-2
In the first two experiments, we considered a memory-based explanation 
for the question order bias: that people estimate their performance by recalling 
individual questions from the test, but the set of questions recalled contains a 
disproportionate  number  of  early  questions.  In  Experiment  1,  we  found no 
evidence that early questions are especially available for recall—in fact,  later 
questions were remembered best and first. In Experiment 2, we showed that 
even drawing subjects’ attention to the last few questions before they estimated 
their  performance did not change the size of  the question order bias.  Taken 
together, these results suggest the question order bias is not driven by students’ 
memory for individual questions on the test.
The best explanation for the question order bias remains the idea, first 
proposed by Weinstein and Roediger (2010, 2012), that students form an initial 
impression about their performance—one that reflects their experiences as the 
test begins, and one from which they do not sufficiently adjust to account for 
later questions. Our results from Experiment 2 suggest that it may be difficult to 
encourage students to ignore these unhelpful first impressions. In fact, sticky, 
stubborn  first  impressions  have  a  long  and  venerable  history  in  social 
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psychology (Hastie & Park, 1986; McConnell, Sherman, & Hamilton, 1997). But 
do  students  always  rely  on  their  impressions  when  they  estimate  their 
performance on a recent test? That approach makes sense as a way for students 
to quickly aggregate and use a large amount of relevant information from a 
large number of questions. But do students still use this approach when there 
are only a few questions to consider?  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Chapter 3: Test Length as a Potential Boundary Condition
The length of a test may be a factor that predicts whether students will 
display the question order bias. On the one hand, primacy effects in impression 
formation are found for lists of target-relevant information that are as short as 
five items long (Anderson, 1973). On the other hand, there is little uncertainty 
about students’  overall  performance when there are only a few questions to 
incorporate and evaluate. It might be sufficiently easy and more accurate for 
students to thoroughly recall each test question in turn and evaluate whether 
they think they answered the question correctly or not, tallying as they go. That 
is, students may instead adopt a memory-based approach for short tests. If so, 
the arrangement of test questions shouldn’t matter—assuming it was easy for 
students  to  accurately  remember  all  questions  on the  test.  Everyone should 
make similar estimates of performance. 
Until  this  point,  the  question  order  bias  has  only  been  examined for 
somewhat  lengthy  tests  ranging  from  24  to  100  questions  long(Feldman  & 
Bernstein, 1977; Weinstein & Roediger, 2012). In Experiment 3, we measure the 
size of the question order bias for tests that range from 3 to 50 questions.
Experiment 3
Method
Subjects. Based on our pilot studies and past exclusion rates, we aimed 
to recruit 420 subjects . Before exclusions, we recruited 431 subjects on MTurk 14
to participate in exchange for $0.50 .15
 We ran a different pilot study for each of Experiments 3, 4, and 5. These pilot studies collected 14
roughly 20 participants per cell.  We then identified a key comparison between cells that we 
wanted to make. Based on the margin of error of the confidence interval required to reliably 
detect that effect with 99% confidence and the sample standard deviation from that study, we 
estimated the number of subjects we would need in those cells to reach that level of precision 
(Cumming, 2012).
 Thirty two people did not complete the entire experiment and we therefore did not include 15
them in our data analyses.
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Design. We used a 2 (Test item order: Easy-Hard, Hard-Easy) X 4 (Test 
Length:  50  Questions,  25  Questions,  10  Questions,  3  Questions)  between 
subjects design.
Materials  and  procedure.  To  begin,  we  gave  subjects  the  same 
instructions as in Experiment 2,  but altered to them refer to the appropriate 
number of questions. Next, subjects began their test. Tests were either arranged 
from the easiest to the most difficult question or vice versa (according to the 
Nelson & Narens, 1980 norms). The 50 question test was same as Test A, used in 
Experiment 2.  Each other test  contained the same range (97% to 0.40%) and 
comparable mean levels of accuracy. The 50 question test had a mean normed 
accuracy of 48%, the 25 question test had 46%, the 10 question had 43%, and the 
3 question test had 49% (see Appendix B for the questions and answers for each 
remaining test). After their test, subjects estimated the number of questions they 
had answered correctly.  Finally,  we asked them to “Please tell  us a little  bit 
about how you made your estimation of how many questions you answered 
correctly on the test.” Subjects responded by filling in a blank text box.
Results and Discussion 
Before turning to our primary question, we excluded 112 subjects failing 
the IMC and/or indicating that they had looked up the answer to at least one of 
the questions on the test . These exclusions left 319 subjects for analysis. See 16
Appendix E for details about demographics.
Did  subjects  show  the  question  order  bias  even  after  short  tests?  To 
answer  this  question,  we  compared  the  difference  in  subjects’  bias  scores 
between those who took an Easy-Hard test and those who took a Hard-Easy 
test. These results appear in Figure 4. Consistent with the idea that people use a 
recall-based strategy rather than an impression-based strategy for estimates on 
shorter tests, the question order bias (difference between Easy-Hard and Hard-
Easy subjects' bias scores) decreased as the number of test questions decreased. 
 The pattern of exclusions did not vary depending on test order X2 (1, N = 112) = 7.19, p = 0.21.16
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The  question  order  bias  was  trivial,  and  even  slightly  reversed  for  the  3 
question test. In NHST terms, people’s performance-corrected estimates after an 
Easy-Hard test were significantly more optimistic than after a Hard-Easy test 
for each test length (p50 = 0.01; p25 = 0.01; p10 = 0.05) except for three questions 
long, t(311) = 0.32, p = 0.75.
Our qualitative data were also consistent with the idea that people use a 
different strategy to estimate their performance on short tests than on long tests. 
We asked subjects to explain, in their own words, what strategy they used to 
estimate  their  performance.  We were  particularly  interested in  subjects  who 
mentioned they used a  strategy that  might  be  seen as  reliant  on an overall 
impression or as reliant on a more recall-based strategy such as retrospectively 
tallying  questions  or  using  the  availability  heuristic.  A volunteer,  blind  to 
condition, coded each response into one of five categories: Impression/Guess, 
Retrospective Tally, On-Line Tally, Irrelevant/Vague and Other (see Appendix C 
for examples of responses that were coded into each category).
As can be seen in Table 3,  subjects were clearly more likely to report 
using a strategy that  relied on a guess or  an overall  impression about their 
performance when the test had more questions. Conversely, subjects reported 
using a retrospective, memory-based approach much more often for estimations 
Figure 4. The mean difference between the number of questions people estimated they 
answered  correctly  and  the  actual  number  of  questions  they  answered  correctly, 
standardised as a percentage of the total number of questions on the test. All error bars 
represent 95% CIs for each cell mean.
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about  the  short  tests,  especially  for  the  3-question test.  In  NHST terms,  we 
found that people’s self-reported strategies were not equally distributed across 
the tests of each different length, X2 (12, N = 319) = 67.01, p < 0.01 .17
We also compared the size of the question order bias between subjects 
who reported using a “Retrospective” strategy an those who reported relying 
on  an  “Impression/Guess.”  Subjects  who  reported  using  a  “Retrospective” 
strategy  showed  a  very  small  question  order  bias  (Mdiff  =  3.10%),  95%  CI 
[-2.60%, 8.77%]. By contrast, subjects who reported relying on an “Impression/
Guess”  showed  a  substantial  question  order  bias  (Mdiff  =  16.65%),  95%  CI 
[6.78%,  26.52%].  In  NHST terms,  there  was  a  significant  Test  order  by  self-
reported strategy interaction, F(1, 141) = 5.50, p = .02.
It  is  also important  to  note  that  subjects  tended to  overestimate their 
performance on the 3-question test—regardless of the order of questions (Figure 
4). This pattern could be a byproduct of the strategy subjects used to make their 
estimate. If subjects thoroughly recalled all three questions from the test and 
retrospectively evaluated their performance on each, it would be expected that 
the average subject believes they answered one (easy) question correctly, and 
Table 3. The percentage of people who used each self-reported strategy
Strategy Type 3 Questions 
(Expected)
10 Questions 
(Expected)
25 Questions 
(Expected)
50 Questions 
(Expected)
Impression/
Guess
7.32 (22.87) 24.44 (25.11) 37.97 (22.04) 45.59 (18.97)
Retrospective 
Tally
78.05 (39.59) 50.00 (43.45) 31.65 (38.14) 29.41 (32.83)
On-line Tally 0 (2.31) 5.56 (2.54) 3.80 (2.23) 3.33 (1.47)
Irrelevant/Vague 12.2 (15.68) 16.67 (17.21) 26.58 (15.11) 22.06 (13.00)
Other 2.44 (1.54) 3.33 (1.69) 0 (1.49) 1.47 (1.28)
 Some of the cells in our table had no subjects. Because of this missing data, the Chi-squared 17
test we ran may be invalid. To account for this problem we ran a second analysis in which we 
only compared the patterns of responses between people who used the “Retrospective Tally” 
and the “Impression/Guess” strategies. Again, we found that people’s self-reported strategies 
were not equally distributed across the tests of each different length, X2 (3, N = 243) = 49.39, p < 
0.01.
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one (difficult) question incorrectly. The only unknown would be the question of 
medium difficulty. Subjects would be more likely to judge that they answered 
the  medium question  correctly  because  generally,  people  err  on  the  side  of 
optimism  for  those  types  of  judgements  (Metcalfe,  1998;  see  Metcalfe  & 
Shimamura, 1994 for a review). Such an error could produce the overall pattern 
of optimism we found for subjects who took 3-question test. 
Taken together, the data from this experiment suggest students do not 
show the question order bias for short tests. When there are fewer questions on 
the test, there is less uncertainty about students’ performance on each question 
once the test is completed. When there is less uncertainty about performance, 
students are less likely to use a composite impression about the test as a whole 
to  estimate  their  performance.  Instead  the  results  of  Experiment  3  suggest 
students  use  a  more  memory-based strategy such as  recalling the  questions 
from their test and retrospectively tallying their performance. Such a strategy 
would be relatively easy to perform for short tests. When students recall and 
retrospectively tally their performance on all test questions, the question order 
bias is not formed. Instead, students seem to overestimate their performance on 
the “medium” question, and accurately tally their performance on the easy and 
difficult  ones—regardless  of  the  order  they  were  presented  on  the  test. 
Therefore, educators do not need to worry about the question order bias when 
they administer very short tests.  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Chapter 4: Warnings and the Question Order Bias
Of course, it is impractical to expect educators to solely rely on short tests 
to assess their students’  knowledge. We therefore investigated another,  more 
practical  way  to  accomplish  the  goal  of  reducing  the  question  order  bias—
simply warning students that their test is arranged by difficulty.
In order to make use of such a warning to debias their judgements of 
performance, students must a) be made aware of the potential for bias, b) know 
the direction of the bias, c) have an estimate of the magnitude of the bias, and d) 
have the ability to effectively apply this information (Wilson & Brekke, 1994). 
Because  many  impressions  are  formed  both  unintentionally  and  outside  of 
awareness, the likelihood of spontaneously recognising the potential for bias is 
perhaps quite minimal. A warning can make students aware of the fact that self-
evaluation of their performance may be biased by the structure of the test itself. 
Such a warning should prompt attempts to prevent or correct for the potential 
bias.
There are, however, several ways in which these attempts may go awry. 
When people adjust their judgements to account for a potential bias, they do so 
based on their own naïve theories about its magnitude and direction (Petty & 
Wegener,  1993).  But these naïve theories may or may not be accurate.  If  the 
warning is not specific enough about the magnitude or direction of the question 
order bias, students could overcompensate, or worse, make estimates that are 
even more biased (Lombardi, Higgins, & Bargh, 1987; Strack, Schwarz, Bless, 
Kubler, & Wanke, 1993). As a result, students who are warned before an Easy-
Hard  test  may  end  up  even  more  optimistic  than  they  were  without  the 
warning or they may overcorrect to the point of being pessimistic about their 
performance. The same logic, in reverse, can be applied to students who are 
warned before a Hard-Easy test.
Even if  a  warning were specific about  both direction and magnitude, 
students  may  not  be  able  to  apply  that  information  effectively.  Impression 
formation involves both automatic  and controlled components  (McCarthy & 
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Skowronski, 2011). Even when the more controlled components of impression 
formation are disrupted, the automatic components still result in an impression
—albeit  a  much  weaker  one—being  formed  (Crawford,  et  al.,  2007;  Wells, 
Skowronski, Crawford, Scherer, & Carlston, 2011). Thus, if students cannot exert 
good control over impression formation or subsequent adjustment, warnings 
could have little-to-no effect over the size of the question order bias. We already 
know warnings are ineffective for helping people adjust from irrelevant starting 
points  to  make  more  accurate  numerical  estimates  (Epley  & Gilovich,  2005, 
2006;  Wilson,  Houston,  Etling,  &  Brekke,  1996).  There  are  also  many  other 
examples of people’s failures to discount irrelevant information when making 
judgments  about  a  target  even  after  having  seen  a  warning  (see  Wilson  & 
Brekke, 1994 for a review).
Taken  together,  it  is  unclear  whether  warning  students  about  the 
question order bias will cause them to make less-biased estimates of their test 
performance.  To  investigate  this  issue,  we  measured  the  extent  to  which  a 
warning  changes  the  magnitude  or  direction  of  this  question  order  bias  in 
Experiment 4. Then, we provided some evidence for the mechanism behind this 
change in Experiment 5.
Experiment 4
Method
Subjects. Based on a pilot study, we aimed to collect 500 subjects (125 
participants for each between subjects cell). A total of 509 subjects finished the 
experiment, 55 from Victoria University of Wellington participated online; 128 
participated in-person for course credit, and 326 from MTurk received $0.50  .18 19
Design.  We  used  a  2  (Test  order:  Easy-Hard,  Hard-Easy)  X  2 
(Instructions: Warning, No Warning) between subjects design.
 One hundred and eight online subjects from Victoria University of Wellington and 41 MTurk 18
subjects  did  not  complete  the  entire  experiment  and  were  therefore  not  included  in  our 
analyses. 
 Subjects from each source did not appear evenly in each experimental  condition,  but the 19
source of each subject did not significantly interact with either factor (all p’s > 0.34).
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Materials and procedure. First, we gave half the subjects the same initial 
instructions as subjects who took a 50 question test in Experiment 3. We told the 
other half of the subjects the same information, but also included a warning that 
stated: 
The 50 questions on this test are arranged in a very specific way. The test 
begins with easy [difficult] questions, and then gradually the questions 
become more difficult [easier]. Therefore, the questions change over the 
course of the test from easy [difficult] questions to "medium" questions 
and  then  to  difficult  [easy]  questions.  Research  shows  that  when 
questions  are  arranged  in  this  way,  the  arrangement  influences  how 
people think they will do on the whole test. So as you answer the first 
few questions on this test, you may find yourself forming an impression 
of what the whole test will be like. Don't do that. Remember, the test 
starts  with  easy  [difficult]  questions,  then  progresses  to  "medium" 
questions, and then to difficult [easy] questions. That means your first 
impression may not give you good information about how well you will 
answer all the questions on the test.
All  subsequent  procedures  were  identical  to  the  “No  Recall”  group  from 
Experiment 3.
Results and Discussion
We excluded 137 (27%) subjects for failing the IMC and/or indicating 
that they had looked up the answer to at least one of the questions on the test . 20
These exclusions left 372 subjects for analysis. See Appendix E for details about 
demographics.
Performance. We first verified that neither test order nor the presence of 
a warning affected subjects’ actual performance on the trivia test. Table 4 shows 
that  subjects  answered  nearly  half  of  the  questions  correctly  for  all 
combinations  of  test  orders  and  warnings.  In  NHST  terms,  there  were  no 
 The pattern of exclusions did not vary depending on test order X2 (1, N = 137) = 0.56, p = 0.46.20
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significant main effects or interactions between Test order and Warning on the 
number of questions people answered correctly on their tests, all Fs < 1. 
Question order bias. We now turn to our primary question: how 
effective were warnings in reducing the question order bias? To answer this 
question, we compared the difference between the bias scores from Easy-Hard 
subjects and Hard-Easy subjects based on whether or not the subjects had 
received a warning. The results appear in Figure 5. As the figure shows, 
although the question order bias was reduced, the warning did not operate 
symmetrically between the question orders. That is, subjects who took a Hard-
Easy test were much less pessimistic when they received a warning than when 
they received no warning (Mdiff = 4.36%), 95% CI [0.50%, 8.20%]. By contrast, 
subjects who took an Easy-Hard test were only slightly less optimistic (Mdiff = 
2.48%), 95% CI [-1.16%, 6.12%]. In NHST terms, there was a significant Test 
order by Warning interaction, F(3, 368) = 6.42, p = .01. 
What  might  have  caused  this  lop-sided  influence  of  warnings?  One 
possibility is a self-serving feature of the fundamental attribution error (Ross, 
1977).  People  are  more  likely  to  attribute  positive  experiences  to  their  own, 
internal  factors,  but  they are more likely to explain negative experiences by 
seeking out third-party, external factors. (Pyszczynski, Greenberg, and LaPrelle, 
1985, see Mezulis,  Abramson, Hyde, & Hankin, 2004).  In other words, Easy-
Hard subjects may have resisted abandoning the idea that they had actually 
performed well, and therefore hardly heeded the warning. By contrast, Hard-
Easy  subjects  may  have  readily  abandoned  the  idea  that  they  actually 
Table 4. Subjects’ mean performance on the trivia test represented by the percentage of 
correct answers. The numbers in brackets represent 95% confidence intervals of each cell 
mean.
Test Order No Warning Warning
Easy-Hard 47.7% [44.76%, 50.64%] 49.60% [45.66%, 53.52%]
Hard-Easy 49.22% [45.3%, 53.16%] 49.08% [44.62%, 53.56%]
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performed poorly in favour of the idea that the arrangement of the questions 
made them think they performed worse than they really did.
But it is still unclear exactly how and when subjects may have used the 
information in the warning. There were a few points during which they could 
have  reacted.  For  example,  subjects  may  have  responded  immediately  and 
discounted the feelings of ease or difficulty provided by the first few questions, 
thus setting a more balanced “central” starting point for their impressions (see 
Schwarz, 2011 for a review). Alternatively, subjects could have responded to the 
warning throughout the course of the entire test. After seeing a warning, they 
may  have  concentrated  on  sufficiently  adjusting  from  their  extreme  initial 
experience of ease or difficulty (Epley & Gilovich, 2006). Warned subjects may 
have  adopted  a  less  conservative  criterion  for  how  much  to  adjust  their 
impression  as  they  took  the  test,  which  resulted  in  larger  adjustments  and 
therefore  less  extreme  estimates  of  performance  (LeBoeuf  &  Shafir,  2009). 
Subjects also could have made use of the warning at the end of the test, when 
they were constructing their estimates of performance. Once they formed their 
estimate, they may have retrospectively adjusted it up or down depending on 
their understanding of what the warning suggested (Epley & Gilovich, 2005; 
Figure 5. The mean difference between the number of questions people estimated they 
answered  correctly  and  the  actual  number  of  questions  they  answered  correctly, 
displayed as a percentage of the total number of test questions. All error bars represent 
95% CIs for each cell mean.
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Wilson & Brekke, 1994). Subjects could have made use of the warning at any 
one or a mix of these time points in an attempt to form an accurate estimate of 
their performance.
In Experiment 5, we investigated the time point at which subjects heeded 
the warning about the question order bias. We asked subjects to predict their 
overall performance after having encountered only a few questions. If subjects 
who are warned make similar predictions regardless of whether they had just 
answered several easy questions or several hard questions, it would suggest a 
warning  helped  them  discount  their  initially  extreme  experience  of  ease  or 
difficulty and set a less-biased impression even after just the first few questions. 
If subjects predict markedly different performance regardless of whether they 
are warned, it would suggest the warning’s effects took place some time after 
subjects formed their initial impressions—such as on-line throughout the rest of 
the test, or after the test was complete.
Experiment 5
Method
Subjects. Based on a pilot study, we aimed to collect 200 subjects (50 for 
each between subjects cell). Two hundred and two people completed the entire 
experiment.  Twenty  two  subjects  from  Victoria  University  of  Wellington 
participated  for  course  credit  and  180  subjects  from  MTurk  participated  in 
exchange for $0.20 . 21
Design.  We used a 2 (Test question order: Easy-Hard, Hard-Easy) X 2 
(Instructions: Warning, No Warning) between subjects design.
Procedure. We used the same procedure as in Experiment 4, but instead 
of  subjects  having  taken  the  entire  50  question  test  before  estimating  their 
performance, they predicted their overall performance after just the first five 
questions.  We compared these predictions to investigate the extent to which 
 Three people  from MTurk and 10 people  from Victoria  University  of  Wellington did not 21
complete the entire experiment and we therefore did not include them in our data analyses.
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warnings about the question order bias can change the way people form their 
initial impressions about the test they are taking.
Results and Discussion
Before turning to our primary question, we excluded 40 (20%) subjects 
for failing the IMC and/or indicating that they had looked up the answer to at 
least one of the questions on the test . These exclusions left 162 subjects for 22
analysis . See Appendix E for details about demographics.23
 To what extent did warning subjects about the question order bias help 
subjects to form less extreme initial impressions about their test? As Figure 6 
shows, the answer depended on the order of questions. That is, the warning 
helped Hard-Easy subjects more than Easy-Hard subjects. Hard-Easy subjects 
predicted markedly better performance after five questions when they saw a 
warning than when they did not, (Mdiff = 14.02%), 95% CI [4.90%, 23.18%], and 
Easy-Hard subjects predicted only somewhat lower performance (Mdiff = 7.06%), 
 Subjects were more likely to be excluded for failing the IMC in the Easy-Hard conditions, but 22
were more likely to be excluded for cheating in the Hard-Easy condition, X2 (1, N = 40) = 10.25, p 
< 0.01. 
 After exclusions, between 2 and 4 subjects from Victoria University of Wellington appeared in 23
each condition.
Figure  6.  The  mean number  of  questions  people  predicted  they  would  answer 
correctly on the test after having answered the first five questions, expressed as a 
percentage of the overall number of questions. Dotted lines represent actual mean 
performance for subjects in each cell. All error bars represent 95% CIs for each cell 
mean.
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95% CI [-1.54%, 15.64%].  In NHST terms,  there was a Warning x Test  order 
interaction, F(3, 158) = 11.03, p < 0.01. This asymmetry can also be explained as 
an effect of self-serving biases in the same way that people’s global estimates of 
performance can be explained.
On the whole, the results of Experiment 5 are consistent with the idea 
that  a  warning reduces  the  question order  bias  by  helping students  form a 
centralised initial  impression of the test that requires less adjustment than it 
would if there was no warning. Despite this evidence, these results do not rule 
out the possibility that students who are warned also correct for the question 
order bias at later time points such as throughout the remainder of the test or 
once the test is completed.
Summary of Experiments 4 and 5
In Experiments 4 and 5,  we evaluated a practical way to mitigate the 
question order bias even on a lengthy test—forewarning. Warnings can only 
effectively help students change their judgements of performance if they have 
control over them in the first place and know how they should change them. 
Taken together, the results from Experiments 4 and 5 suggest people do have 
some control over how they form and adjust their impressions about the test 
and that this control translates to less extreme judgements of performance. With 
the help of a warning, students can form a less extreme starting point from 
which to adjust their impressions of a test as it progresses. As a result, when 
they see a warning that  alerts  them to the fact  their  tests  are arranged in a 
potentially biasing way, those who take an Easy-Hard test can make estimates 
of performance that are more similar to those who take a Hard-Easy test. 
The warning reduced the question order bias,  and it  was particularly 
effective for  subjects  who took a Hard-Easy test.  But  it  did not  result  in all 
subjects estimating equal performance on average. Why not? Consider that the 
warning contained no information about the magnitude of the bias. Without 
this information, subjects were left to guess how much to adjust, and in doing 
so, may have drawn on their own naïve theories and motivational biases (Petty 
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& Wegener, 1993). Research on self-serving attributions suggests that after the 
first  few questions  on  the  test,  Hard-Easy  students  should  be  motivated  to 
attribute their initial experience of difficulty to something external to their self, 
(i.e. the structure of the test) whereas Easy-Hard students will be motivated to 
attribute their initial  experience of ease to something internal (i.e.  their own 
abilities; Pyszczynski, et al., 1984, see Campbell & Sedikides, 1999 and Mezulis 
et al., 2004). The warning provides a convenient external scapegoat for Hard-
Easy students, but Easy-Hard students need no such scapegoat. Thus, Hard-
Easy students should be able to discount their initial experiences of extreme 
difficulty and more easily adopt centralised, “big picture” initial impressions of 
the test overall.  By contrast,  even though Easy-Hard students may recognise 
that there is the potential for bias based on the structure of the test, their initial 
impressions may still be fairly biased towards optimism because they should be 
unmotivated to attribute their initial experience of ease to the structure of the 
test itself.
Also consider that there are both automatic and controlled components 
involved in the impression formation process (McCarthy & Skowronski, 2011). 
It is possible that subjects heeded the warning to the best of their ability, but 
that  automatic  processes  prevented  them  from  fully  centralising  their 
impressions. Thus, even if we used a thorough, explicit warning that contained 
information about magnitude, it is possible we would find students still display 
the question order bias.  This cognitive process and the motivational  process 
discussed above are not mutually exclusive and could both contribute to the 
effectiveness of the warning used in Experiments 4 and 5.
Across  the  previous  five  studies,  we  replicated  and  explored  the 
mechanism behind the  finding that  Easy-Hard students  are  more  optimistic 
about their test performance than Hard-Easy students.  Overall,  this question 
order  bias  seems  robust  as  researchers  have  detected  it  across  a  variety  of 
experimental designs: between and within subjects; presentation media: paper 
and pencil, digital; and test formats: multi-choice, and cued recall (Jackson & 
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Greene,  2014;  Weinstein  &  Roediger,  2010,  2012).  We  also  provided  some 
evidence that Easy-Hard students and Hard-Easy students do not differ much 
in  how well  they actually  perform.  These  findings  contribute  to  the  overall 
debate about whether ordering questions on a test affects students' performance 
(Aamodt  &  McShane,  1992;  Jackson  &  Greene,  2014;  Vander  Schee,  2013; 
Weinstein & Roediger, 2010, 2012). But given the recent focus in psychology on 
departure from NHST and its new focus on replication and estimation (see the 
November 2012 Perspectives on Psychological Science, the February 2012 Observer, 
www.psychfiledrawer.org;  Cumming,  2012;  Michael,  Newman,  Vuorre, 
Cumming, & Garry, 2013), we will establish a more precise estimate of the size 
of the question order bias and the effect of question order on performance than 
can be inferred from any individual experiment. To accomplish these goals, we 
performed a mini meta-analysis of several published and unpublished studies 
that  compared  subjects’  actual  performance  on  and  subjective  estimates  of 
performance after taking either an Easy-Hard or a Hard-Easy test.  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Chapter 5: Meta-Analysis of the Question Order Bias
Here we report a small-scale meta-analysis that synthesises the studies 
conducted over the course of my thesis to investigate an important question: 
How much does  the  order  of  questions  on a  test  affect  people’s  actual  and 
estimated  performance  on  a  test?  This  type  of  small-scale  meta-analysis  is 
useful for obtaining a precise estimate of the size of an effect over in a single 
line of research (Cumming, 2012). It is not intended to be exhaustive, and we 
did not search for studies to include outside of those that were conducted over 
the course of my thesis. 
Method
Subjects.  Across the 15 studies that  make up this meta-analysis,  2256 
subjects were analysed.
Design.  Each  experiment  in  this  meta-analysis  compared two groups 
(Test order: Easy-Hard, Hard-Easy) between subjects.
Materials and procedure.  For all experiments in this analysis, subjects 
took tests comprised of cued-recall trivia questions that were normed by Nelson 
and  Narens  (1980).  These  questions  ranged  from  97.40%  correct  to  .004% 
correct.  This  percentage functioned as  a  proxy for  the experience of  ease or 
difficulty.  Questions  that  many  subjects  tended  to  answer  correctly  were 
considered easy and questions that many subjects tended to answer incorrectly 
were considered difficult. Across studies, the number of questions on the trivia 
tests ranged from three to 50 (see Table 5). Subjects took a test with questions 
that  were  arranged  from the  easiest  to  the  most  difficult  or  from the  most 
difficult to the easiest. Directly after their test, subjects estimated the number of 
questions they answered correctly.
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For  all  experiments  that  were  conducted online,  after  the  experiment 
proper concluded, subjects to responded to a series of questions designed to 
identify those who who did not take the task seriously, as well as those who 
had not complied with the instructions. To identify people who did not take the 
task seriously, we used an IMC. To identify subjects who did not comply with 
the  instructions,  we used the same “catch-out”  question as  we described in 
Experiment 1. Only subjects who chose "I answered each question from my own 
memory" were included in our analyses.
Table 5. Information about the subjects and test for each study in the mini meta-analysis.
Study Name Source of Subjects Medium N Notes
Franco & Garry: MTurk Replication 
(unpublished)
MTurk Online 95 50 Trivia Questions
Franco & Garry: MTurk Replication 
2 (unpublished)
MTurk Online 70 50 Trivia Questions
Franco & Garry: MTurk Replication 
3 (unpublished)
MTurk and Victoria University 
of Wellington Undergraduates
Online 191 50 Trivia Questions
Franco & Garry: Test Length 
(unpublished)
MTurk Online 68 50 Trivia Questions
Franco & Garry: Test Length 
(unpublished)
MTurk Online 79 25 Trivia Questions
Franco & Garry: Test Length 
(unpublished)
MTurk Online 90 10 Trivia Questions
Franco & Garry: Test Length 
Replication (unpublished)
MTurk Online 151 10 Trivia Questions
Franco & Garry: Test Length 
Replication 2 (unpublished)
MTurk Online 108 10 Trivia Questions
Franco & Garry: Test Length 
(unpublished)
MTurk Online 82 3 Trivia Questions
Franco & Garry, Recall Last 5 
(unpublished)
MTurk Online 223 50 Trivia Questions; 
No Recall Condition
Franco & Garry, Recall Last 5 
(unpublished)
MTurk Online 222 50 Trivia Questions; 
Recall Condition
Franco & Garry: Exhaustive Recall 
(unpublished)
MTurk Online 245 50 Trivia Questions; 
No Recall Condition
Franco & Garry: Exhaustive Recall 
(unpublished)
MTurk Online 260 50 Trivia Questions; 
Recall Condition
Franco, Crawford, & Garry: 
Warnings, exp 1 (ms in prep)
MTurk and Victoria University 
of Wellington Undergraduates
Online and 
In-person
194 50 Trivia Questions; 
No Warning Condition
Franco, Crawford, & Garry: 
Warnings, exp 1 (ms in prep)
MTurk and Victoria University 
of Wellington Undergraduates
Online and 
In-person
178 50 Trivia Questions; 
Warning Condition
TOTAL 2256
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Results and Discussion
Scoring criteria. For all studies, we marked questions according to the 
same formula as described in Experiment 2. Consistent with Experiments 2-4, 
we  operationalised  the  question  order  bias  as  a  measure  of  the  difference 
between subjects’ bias scores after an Easy-Hard test and those after a Hard-
Easy test.
Number  correct.  We  compared  the  number  of  questions  answered 
correctly by subjects who took an Easy-Hard test and subjects who took a Hard-
Easy  test.  Figure  7  contains  the  size  of  the  difference  between  groups  as 
expressed by a percentage of questions on the test, the standard error, variance, 
95% confidence intervals of the effect size, a z-score for a comparison between 
groups, and a p-value for each individual comparison in each study and for the 
meta-analysed random effect. 
Overall,  subjects  who took an Easy-Hard test  performed only slightly 
(although plausibly not at all) better than subjects who took a Hard-Easy test, 
Mdiff = 0.48%, 95% CI [-0.99, 1.95]. This low estimate is consistent with recent 
claims that the order of questions on a test does not greatly influence people's 
performance  (Jackson  &  Greene,  2014;  Vander  Schee,  2013;  Weinstein  & 
Roediger, 2010, 2012). We found no significant evidence of heterogeneity in our 
model, Q(14) = 14.66, p = 0.40.
Question order bias. Figure 8 contains the size of the question order bias 
(a difference in means, expressed as a percentage of questions on the test), the 
standard error, variance, 95% confidence intervals of the effect size, a z-score for 
a comparison between groups, and a p-value for each individual comparison in 
each study and for the meta-analysed random effect. Overall, subjects who took 
an Easy-Hard test made more optimistic estimates of performance than people 
who took a Hard-Easy test, Mdiff = 9.10%, 95% CI [6.92, 11.29]. This difference 
amounts to nearly an entire letter grade in most university courses. Put another 
way, a student who expected a B might have actually earned a C. This estimate 
might  be  slightly  conservative  because  we  included  studies  that  used 
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manipulations  meant  to  mitigate  the  question  order  bias—regardless  of 
whether those manipulations were effective. For example, the bias is likely to be 
considerably  smaller  for  studies  that  used  very  short  tests  or  forewarned 
subjects before they began. Such studies were likely responsible for the high 
proportion of variance due to heterogeneity we found in our model, Q(14) = 
47.23, p < 0.01, I2 = 70.36. 
The constrained scope of our meta-analysis limits our ability to compare 
our estimate of the difference in actual performance between Easy-Hard and 
Hard-Easy  students  with  estimates  from previous  meta-analyses.  Our  study 
estimates the difference in performance to be smaller than previously estimated 
(Aamodt & McShane, 1992). It is possible that the studies that show a consistent 
advantage  in  performance  for  Easy-Hard  students  contain  systematic 
differences that make the effect larger than the effect found in our studies. A 
comprehensive meta-analysis of both samples and a wider search for studies 
from the file drawer is a fruitful avenue for future research. 
One related methodological limitation of this mini meta-analysis is the 
fact that all studies used very similar materials. The question order bias may 
vary in size based on the content of the test. For example, it is possible that the 
bias takes hold only when the questions provide a wide range in experience 
from extreme ease to extreme difficulty. Each test in this meta-analysis provided 
such a range because they were comprised of questions that were normed to do 
so. Perhaps tests that provide a more restricted range of difficulty might not 
produce extreme enough initial impressions between Easy-Hard students and 
Hard-Easy students. If the gap in initial impressions is not large to begin with, 
students would not need to adjust much to meet in the middle and provide 
relatively similar estimates of performance. Future research on this topic would 
have implications for the generalisability of the question order bias from highly 
normed  and  structured  tests  to  non-academic  testing  settings  such  as 
eyewitness interviews.  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Chapter 6: General Discussion
Summary
 In six studies, we investigated how the question order bias is formed, its 
magnitude, and some of its limits. Experiments 1a-d and 2 eliminated memory 
for performance on individual questions as a plausible explanation for this bias. 
These  results  are  consistent  with  studies  that  show  there  is  often  little 
relationship between the specific exemplars people can recall  and the global 
judgements people make about the source of  those exemplars (see Hastie & 
Park, 1986 for a review). Instead, a combination of extreme initial impressions 
and insufficient adjustment from those extreme impressions remains the most 
plausible  explanation  for  the  question  order  bias  (Jackson  &  Greene,  2014; 
Weinstein & Roediger, 2010, 2012).
Experiment 3 explored the length of the test as a boundary condition for 
the question order bias. The results of Experiment 3 suggest that students adopt 
a different strategy to estimate their performance after a long test than they do 
after a short test. After a short test, subjects were more likely to report recalling 
each question and retrospectively tallying their performance than they were to 
report using a gut-feeling or a guess. This apparent change in strategy resulted 
in subjects avoiding the question order bias after very short tests. The question 
order bias is therefore a larger concern for educators who use lengthy tests than 
those who rely only on very short quizzes.
In  Experiment  4,  we  demonstrated  that  specific  warnings  about  the 
influence question order has on people’s  estimates of  their  performance can 
help students make less-biased estimates, but they are much more effective for 
students who take a Hard-Easy test. These results suggest that students have at 
least some control over the information they use to estimate their performance 
on a test.
In Experiment 5, we provided evidence that students exert this control 
from the very beginning of their tests. Subjects who were warned made less 
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extreme predictions about their overall performance after having seen just a few 
questions on the test—particularly subjects who took a Hard-Easy test. These 
results suggest students heed the warnings by forming a less extreme initial 
impression  of  the  test’s  overall  level  of  difficulty.  As  a  result,  there  is  less 
distance  between  groups’  initial  impressions  from  which  to  adjust  when 
accounting for later test questions.
Finally, our meta-analysis established a more precise estimate for how 
large the question order bias is and how much arranging questions on a test in 
order  by  difficulty  affects  students’  actual  performance.  We  found  that  the 
question  order  bias  is  large  and  robust—resulting  in  a  mean  difference  in 
estimates for Easy-Hard subjects and Hard-Easy subjects of almost an entire 
letter-grade—but the order of questions on the test had little effect on subjects’ 
actual performance. 
The Practicality of Warnings
Because warnings can at least partially mitigate the question order bias, 
it  might  be  tempting to  conclude the bias  is  little  cause for  concern among 
educators. This conclusion would be premature. When we look closer at which 
groups were best at heeding our warnings, only people who took a Hard-Easy 
test  make  substantially  different  predictions  with  and  without  a  warning. 
Because of this fact, the utility of a warning in a real-life classroom context is 
somewhat limited. 
Educators  often  distribute  multiple  versions  of  a  test  to  discourage 
cheating (Vander Schee, 2013). Suppose one version ascended in difficulty and 
one  descended.  In  this  scenario,  educators  might  consider  warning  their 
students  about  these  arrangements  to  reduce  any  relative  difference  in 
judgements  of  performance  between  their  students  and  make  the  situation 
“fairer.” Alternatively, some educators may already have a single favourite way 
of arranging their test questions. If their favourite arrangement is Easy-Hard, 
Experiment  4  demonstrates  a  warning would help  very  little  to  avoid their 
students leaving with overly optimistic beliefs about their performance.
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Perceived Cohesiveness
Warnings might not be an entirely practical way to handle the question 
order  bias  in  a  classroom  after  all.  What  might  be  a  better  way  to  protect 
students  from  undue  optimism  or  pessimism?  One  obvious  answer  is 
immediate  feedback  after  the  test.  This  approach  is  becoming  increasingly 
practical because of multiple choice tests and scoring algorithms.
But what about when immediate feedback is impossible or impractical? 
The social perception literature suggests another promising route to unwinding 
the impressions that  drive the question order  bias:  disrupting the perceived 
cohesiveness of the target being judged (Crawford, Sherman, & Hamilton, 2002; 
McConnell et al., 1997). For example, people given a set of 30 descriptors about 
three members of the same family would be more likely to form an impression 
of those people as a group than if the same descriptors were applied to three 
randomly selected people from anywhere in the world. In the latter scenario, 
people  may  have  no  previously-formed  impression  on  which  to  base  a 
judgement  about  the  group  as  a  whole.  Instead,  people  would  need  to 
retrospectively construct an impression of the group based on memories about 
its individual members before making an overall judgement about the group 
(McConnell et al., 1997).
Following  this  logic,  if  students  were  asked  to  estimate  their 
performance  on  a  30  question  test  divided  into  3  blocks  of  10  (written  by 
teachers A, B, and C), we might not see the question order bias. Students who 
take a divided test are less likely to have formed an impression about the test as 
a  whole.  Instead,  they might  have several  sub-impressions—one for  each of 
blocks A, B, and C. If they are asked to estimate their performance on the test 
overall, they might need to retrospectively construct an impression about the 
ease of the test overall by recalling and incorporating their impressions for each 
individual  block.  One  block  was  easy,  one  was  difficult,  and  one  was  of 
medium difficulty. As a result, the students who take such a divided test may 
show  no  difference  in  estimates  of  performance  regardless  of  the  order  of 
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questions. It is easy to recall and tally three impressions—much like it is easy to 
recall  and tally three questions (see Experiment 3).  If  so,  the implications of 
arranging  test  questions  by  difficulty  could  vary  for  team-taught  courses 
compared to solo-taught courses—especially when questions are “batched” by 
teacher.
Drop-out Rate
The majority of studies in this thesis were conducted entirely online. One 
aspect of online data collection that makes it different from in-person data 
collection is experiments conducted online are not monitored by an 
experimenter. As a result, online subjects are more likely to leave the 
experiment before finishing, or “drop out.” Subjects may also drop out for a 
number of additional reasons, not necessarily related to the fact the experiment 
is unmonitored. For example, some may drop out because of internet 
connectivity issues, environmental distractions, or emergencies. But subjects in 
our online experiments consistently failed to complete the entire test when it 
was arranged from Hard-Easy more often than when it was arranged from 
Easy-Hard. 
Recall that when people take a test that begins with difficult questions, 
their anxiety levels raise and this increase in anxiety may negatively affect 
performance (Aamodt & McShane, 1992; Munz & Smouse, 1968; for a review, 
see Vander Schee, 2013). Suppose this increase in anxiety also made our online 
subjects more likely to give up on the test. If so, this explanation could account 
for the higher drop-out rates in the Hard-Easy condition for our online 
experiments. 
The subjects in the Hard-Easy condition who did complete the test may 
have been more resilient to increases in anxiety than their counterparts who 
dropped out. As a result, the Hard-Easy group’s mean anxiety level might have 
been artificially deflated due to its high drop-out rate. On one hand, this 
artificial deflation may at least partially explain why we only found a trivial 
and unreliable advantage in performance for Easy-Hard group. On the other 
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hand, previous in-person investigations of the question order bias also found no 
reliable differences in performance between test orders (Jackson & Greene, 2014; 
Weinstein & Roediger, 2010; 2012).
In real-world educational contexts, this pattern of drop outs may have 
even more dire implications. Unlike the subjects in our studies, students who 
don’t complete their tests in school still receive marks for their performance. If 
students are more likely to give up when taking a Hard-Easy test in the 
classroom, studies conducted in labs (or online) may underestimate the effects 
of question order on performance. Imagine that one half of a class takes an 
Easy-Hard test and the other takes a Hard-Easy test. As established in Chapter 
5, those students who complete the test should perform similarly regardless of 
test order. Unfortunately, students who take a Hard-Easy test may be more 
likely to give up on the test. As a result, those who took a Hard-Easy test would 
have a lower mean score than those who took an Easy-Hard test. Future 
research on students in actual educational environments should take this 
information into account when evaluating the effects of test order on 
performance.
Test Length
Another fruitful avenue for future research would be to establish more 
precise  boundary  conditions  for  the  question  order  bias.  For  example, 
Experiment 3 demonstrated that people don’t display the question order bias 
for tests that are 3 questions long, but that they do show a small and unreliable 
bias for tests that are 10 questions long. Future research could establish a more 
precise estimate of how many questions an educator could expect to include on 
his or her test before the question order bias becomes a concern. 
One approach to answering this question is to issue eight separate tests 
between 3 and 10 questions long to subjects that are arranged either from Easy-
Hard or from Hard-Easy. This approach would require a very large number of 
subjects  to  reliably  detect  the  question  order  bias  (roughly  50  per  cell),  so 
experimenters should adopt a within subjects design to conserve power. The 
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mini  meta-analysis  within  this  thesis  demonstrates  the  question  order  bias 
remains of similar size regardless of whether the tests are given within subjects 
or between groups, so such a design should be appropriate for establishing this 
boundary condition.
If  this  research  is  conducted,  it  could  help  address  one  important 
limitation of Experiment 3. Namely, it is impossible to determine whether our 
subjects did not display the question order bias on the 3-question test because 
they  chose  a  different  strategy  to  make  their  estimates  (i.e.  a  retrospective 
strategy) or because they simply did not encounter enough material to form a 
biased first impression, so they could not use the same strategy as subjects who 
took longer tests. Studies of impression formation in other domains typically 
use at least five descriptors to demonstrate primacy effects (Andersen, 1973). If 
subjects don't display the question order bias for tests that are five questions 
long,  this  result  could  be  interpreted  as  evidence  they  still  choose  a 
retrospective strategy even though an impression-based strategy is theoretically 
available. 
Predicted Future Performance
Each  experiment  in  this  thesis  measured  the  effect  of  question  order 
either on students’ retrospective estimates of their performance, or prospective 
estimates of their performance on a test they were taking. Future research could 
investigate the degree to which students show the question order bias when 
they predict  performance on a  future  test.  It  is  possible  that  when students 
predict future performance, they ignore their initial impressions. Instead they 
may rely on how their performance changed over time and how well they did 
at the end because these aspects of a test seem more relevant to the future than 
performance at the beginning (Zauberman, Diel, & Aiely, 2006).
The evidence for this hypothesis is mixed. In one study, students who 
finished a test with easy questions predicted better performance in the future 
(Jones  et  al.,  1968).  When  students  took  (what  they  believed  to  be)  an 
intelligence  test  in  either  ascending  or  descending  order  by  difficulty,  they 
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predicted  better  future  performance  when  they  finished  with  many  correct 
answers than when they finished with many incorrect  answers.  But another 
study found the opposite—a pattern more like the question order bias (Feldmen 
& Bernstein, 1977). When students took a geometry test during which students 
had  to  identify  a  previously-seen  target  shape  hidden  within  a  new,  more 
complex  design,  they predicted better  future  performance  when they began 
with  many  correct  answers  than  when  they  finished  with  many  incorrect 
answers.
One  possible  explanation  for  these  conflicting  patterns  of  results  has 
implications  for  how  the  question  order  bias  unfolds  for  predictions  about 
different styles of test. Subjects in the Jones et al. (1968) study who took a test in 
ascending order by difficulty could have predicted better future performance 
because  they  believed  they  discovered  the  “trick”  to  answering  the  logical 
“intelligence”  questions.  The  test  used in  the  Feldman and Bernstein  (1977) 
study may not have afforded the same belief. Future research could investigate 
this possibility by keeping the test itself constant, but manipulating how likely 
Hard-Easy subjects are to attribute their increase in performance to a gain in 
ability throughout the test.  For example,  experimenters could use normative 
feedback  throughout  the  test  to  give  subjects  the  impression  that  their 
performance is improving (or decreasing) due to the difficulty of the test or due 
to the possibility that the subject is getting better or worse at the task. Subjects 
who believe their performance is changing due to changes in their own abilities 
(finding or losing the “trick”) should estimate future performance based on the 
difficulty of the most recent questions. Those who believe their performance is 
only  changing  due  to  changes  in  the  difficulty  of  the  questions  themselves 
should show the opposite pattern—the traditional question order bias—when 
estimating their performance.
Actual Future Performance
Regardless  of  the  direction  of  the  question  order  bias  when  people 
predict their performance in the future, the bias has practical implications for 
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student’s decisions about what and how long to study for an upcoming test. 
Undergraduates commonly take a test at the end of the semester followed by a 
final exam just a few weeks later. The question order bias might influence how 
students decide to study during this interval. On the one hand, those who leave 
their test believing they had performed (or will perform) relatively well might 
not study as hard nor as long as students who leave the test believing they 
performed (or will perform) poorly. On the other hand, their perceived high 
level of performance may give them confidence and subsequently cause them to 
study harder for the next test.  Both of these scenarios are especially likely if 
students believe they are in control of their own level of learning, attribute their 
performance to internal factors, and are intrinsically motivated to perform well 
(Bandura, 1997; Dweck, 1991; Weiner, 1985, 2000).
Future  research  should  investigate  whether  the  arrangement  of 
questions on one test could influence students’ performance on a future test. 
Such an experiment could be run with very similar methods to either of the 
Weinstein and Roediger (2010, 2012) studies. Subjects would simply take a test 
arranged from Easy-Hard or from Hard-Easy in session 1. Then, subjects will 
be excused for a period of time (days or weeks) during which they will need to 
study for their second test. Finally, subjects will come back and take the second 
test.
Informational vs Affective Judgements
The  studies  comprising  this  thesis  suggest  that  students  form  initial 
impressions about a test based on the first few questions and fail to sufficiently 
adjust those impressions to account for the remainder of the questions. Then, 
students  estimate  their  overall  performance  on  the  test  using  this  biased 
impression. This approach is similar to the way people make judgements about 
other people, products, and legal evidence (Anderson & Norman, 1964; Crano, 
1977; Hastie & Park, 1986; Mantonakis et al., 2009; see Hogarth & Einhorn, 1992 
for a review). But people do not adopt this approach for all judgements about 
the events they experience. In fact,  people commonly base their judgements 
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about certain experiences on their peak intensity and the way the experiences 
end (Fredrickson & Kahneman, 1993; Hastie & Park, 1986; Jensen, Martin, & 
Cheung, 2005; Redelmeier & Kahneman, 1996; Redelmeier, Katz, & Kahneman, 
2003;  Stone,  Schwartz,  Broderick,  &  Schiffman,  2005).  For  example,  some 
subjects were asked to make judgements about a colonoscopy they had just 
received.  Half  of  the  subjects  underwent  a  standard  procedure,  and  some 
underwent  a  longer  procedure  that  ended less  painfully  than the  standard. 
Subjects  who  underwent  the  longer  procedure  retrospectively  rated  the 
experience as being less painful and less unpleasant, despite experiencing an 
objectively greater amount of real-time pain during the procedure (Redelmeier, 
et  al.,  2003).  Recent  research  demonstrates  that  these  effects  extend  to 
judgements about how people remember and evaluate future study and test 
scenarios  based  on  whether  a  recent  scenario’s  end  was  mild  or  severe  in 
difficulty (Finn, 2010; Finn & Miele, in press; Hoogerheide & Paas, 2012).
Why do people make judgements about medical procedures based on 
this peak-end rule, but make judgements about tests and people based off of their 
first impression? One theory predicts that people will adopt one strategy when 
making  an  affective  judgement,  but  another  strategy  when  making  an 
informational judgement (see Zauberman et al., 2006). When people rate affective 
traits of an experience or object such as attractiveness, satisfaction, and comfort, 
they generally rely on the peak intensity of those traits, the intensity of those 
traits at the end of their encounter, and the overall trend. By contrast,  when 
people rate evaluative traits such as intelligence, performance, and friendliness, 
they generally rely on their initial impressions of the target. But Weinstein and 
Roediger (2012) found no asymmetry in subjects’  ratings of  how much they 
were enjoying the test while they took it, regardless of whether the questions 
were arranged Easy-Hard or  Hard-Easy.  That  is,  subjects  made a  seemingly 
affective judgement—their  level  of  enjoyment—but were not  biased by their 
peak level of enjoyment or how the test ended. 
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How might we reconcile these conflicting results? One possible avenue 
comes from the exact wording of the judgement subjects made as they took the 
test.  Experimenters asked subjects to rate “How much are you enjoying the 
test?”  at  each  of  10  intervals  throughout  the  test.  This  question  may  have 
elicited moment-to-moment judgements about enjoyment analogous to the real-
time  evaluations  gathered  in  typical  peak-end  rule  studies.  (Redelmeier  & 
Kahneman, 1996; Redelmeier et al., 2003). These moment-to-moment affective 
judgements do not typically differ between groups that end with high intensity 
and those that end with low intensity. If future studies instead ask subjects to 
make a global affective judgement such as “How enjoyable was this test?”, they 
may find a dissociation between subjects who take an Easy-Hard and those 
who take  a  Hard-Easy test.  Both  test  orders  should contain  the  same peak 
intensity of enjoyment, but Easy-Hard tests should end with lower levels of 
enjoyment  than  Hard-Easy  tests.  If  the  literature  on  informational  versus 
affective judgements is correct, subjects who take an Easy-Hard test should rate 
the  test  as  less  enjoyable  overall  than  those  who  take  a  Hard-Easy  test 
(Zauberman et al., 2006).
The Question Order Bias in Other Domains
The question order bias is likely not limited to educational tests. Recent 
research shows that the order in which eyewitnesses answer questions about an 
event an bias their judgements about how well they performed on the set of 
questions  and  their  confidence  about  their  performance  (Michael  &  Garry, 
2015). These results have implications in a court room. Eyewitnesses who seem 
more confident in their memories are more credible to juries than those who 
less confident (Penrod & Cutler, 1997).
Conclusion
When educators arrange their tests in order by difficulty, they may do so 
with benevolent intentions. Some studies show educators typically choose to 
arrange  their  tests  in  order  from  the  easiest  question  to  the  most  difficult 
question in order to decrease anxiety and help weaker students retain their 
!  of !64 83
confidence through the easy questions before they encounter the difficult ones 
(Munz  &  Smouse,  1968;  for  a  review,  see  Vander  Schee,  2013).  But  this 
arrangement does not typically improve students’ actual performance—what is 
worse,  it  fosters  a  positive illusion about  their  actual  performance that  will 
soon be destroyed when the grades are announced. It is not a leap to worry that 
this illusion, or its later destruction, may encourage students to change their 
decisions  about  what  they  study and how long they  study.  Therefore,  it  is 
important that we understand what causes the bias, what its limitations are, 
and how to reduce or eliminate it.  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Appendix A
Test A: Question (Arranged from Easiest to Hardest) Answer
What is the name of the comic strip character who eats spinach to increase 
his strength? popeye
What is the name of the long sleep some animals go through during the 
entire winter? hibernation
What is the capital of France? paris
Which sport uses the terms "gutter" and "alley"? bowling
What is the name of the remains of plants and animals that are found in 
stone? fossils
What is the name of Dorothy's dog in "The Wizard of Oz"? toto
What is the last name of the man who rode horseback in 1775 to warn that 
the British were coming? revere
What is the last name of the singer who recorded "Heartbreak Hotel" and 
"All Shook Up"? presley
What kind of metal is associated with a 50th wedding anniversary? gold
What is the name of the bird that cannot fly and is the largest bird on 
Earth? ostrich
What is the name of the thick layer of fat on a whale? blubber
What is the only liquid metal at room temperature? mercury
For which country is the Yen the monetary unit? japan
What is the last name of the first person to set foot on the moon? armstrong
What is the word that means a nautical mile per hour? knot
What is the largest planet in the solar system? jupiter
In which game are men crowned? checkers
What is the name of the liquid portion of whole blood? plasma
What is the name of the legendary one-eyed giant in Greek mythology? cyclops
What is the name of deer meat? venison
What is the longest river in South America? amazon
What is the name of the chapel whose ceiling was painted by 
Michaelangelo? sistine
What animal runs the fastest? cheetah
What was the last name of the man who was the radio broadcaster for the 
"War of the Worlds"? welles
What is the last name of the author who wrote "The Old Man and the 
Sea"? hemmingway
What is the name of the extinct reptiles known as "terrible lizards"? dinosaurs
What is the last name of the scientist who discovered radium? curie
Of which country is Buenos Aires the capital? argentina
In which city is the U.S. Naval Academy located? annapolis
What is the last name of the man who invented the phonograph? edison
What is the last name of the first signer of the "Declaration of 
Independence?" hancock
Of which country is Nairobi the capital? kenya
What is the name of the Roman emperor who fiddled while Rome 
burned? nero
What Italian city was destroyed when Mount Vesuvius erupted in 79 
A.D.? pompeii
What is the last name of the man who wrote "Canterbury Tales?" chaucer
What is the last name of the author who wrote "Brave New World?" huxley
What is the last name of the man who first studied genetic inheritance in 
plants? mendel
What is the only word the raven says in Edgar Allen Poe's poem "The 
Raven?" nevermore
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For which country is the Rupee the monetary unit? india
Which sport uses the terms "stones" and "brooms"? curling
What is the name of the North Star? polaris
What was the name of the Apollo lunar module that landed the first man 
on the moon? eagle
In what profession was Emmett Kelly? clown
In which city is Michelangelo's statue of David located? florence
What is the last name of the artist who painted "Guernica?" picasso
Over which river is the George Washington Bridge? hudson
What is the name of the brightest star in the sky excluding the sun? sirius
The general named Hannibal was from what city? carthage
What is the last name of the man who is regarded as the national poet of 
Scotland? burns
What is the last name of the union general who defeated the confederate 
army at the civil war battle of Gettysburg? meade
Test B: Question (Arranged from Easiest to Hardest) Answer
What is the name of the horse-like animal with black and white stripes? zebra
What was the name of Tarzan's girlfriend? jane
What is the name of the molten rock that runs down the side of a volcano 
during an eruption? lava
Which sport is associated with Wimbledon? tennis
What is the name of the rubber object that is hit back and forth by hockey 
players? puck
What is the name of an inability to sleep? insomnia
What is the term for hitting a volleyball down hard onto the opponent's 
court? spike
What is the name for a medical doctor who specializes in diseases of the 
skin? dermatologist
What is the last name of the author who wrote "Romeo and Juliet"? shakespeare
What is the name of the process by which plants make their food? photosynthesis
In what park is "Old Faithful" located? yellowstone
What is the name for a cyclone that occurs over land? tornado
What is the name of the large hairy spider that live near bananas? tarantula
What is the name of the navigation instrument used at sea to plot position 
relative to the magnetic north pole? compass
Which breed of cat has blue eyes? siamese
What is the last name of the man who proposed the theory of relativity? einstein
What is the name for the astronomical bodies that enter the Earth's 
atmosphere? meteors
Which game uses a rubber ball and little metal pieces? jacks
What is the name of the short pleated skirt worn by men in Scotland? kilt
What is the name of the ocean that is located between Africa and 
Australia? indian
What is the name of the automobile instrument that measures mileage? odometer
In which sport is the Stanley Cup awarded? hockey
Which games uses a doubling cube? backgammon
What is the last name of the man who assassinated President John F. 
Kennedy? oswald
What is the name of the organ that produces insulin? pancreas
What is the last name of the woman who began the profession of nursing? nightingale
What is the name of the first artificial satellite put in orbit by Russia in 
1957? sputnik
What is the name of the three-leaf clover that is the emblem of Ireland? shamrock
What is the last name of Batman's secret identity in the Batman comics? wayne
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What is the capital of New York? albany
In which game are the standard pieces of Staunton design? chess
What is the last name of the author of the book "1984?" orwell
In what European city is the Parthenon located? athens
What is the last name of the man who invented the telegraph? morse
What was Frank Lloyd Wright's profession? architect
Of which country is Budapest the capital? hungary
In which city is Heathrow Airport located? london
What is the name of the river on which Bonn is located? rhine
In which city does the cotton bowl take place? dallas
What is the capital of Denmark? copenhagen
In what ancient city were the "Hanging Gardens" located? babylon
What is the last name of the man who invented dynamite? nobel
What is the capital of Delaware? dover
What is the name of the ship on which Charles Darwin made his scientific 
voyage? beagle
What is the capital of Chile? santiago
What is the name of the mountain range that separates Asia from Europe? ural
What is the name of the Chinese religion founded by Lao Tse? taoism
What is the name of the instrument used to measure windspeed? anemometer
What is the name of the villainous people who lived underground in H.G. 
Wells' book "The Time Machine?" morlocks
What is the last name of the man who supposedly killed Jesse James? ford
!  of !80 83
Appendix B
25 Question Test: Question Answer
What is the name of the comic strip character who eats spinach to increase his 
strength? popeye
What is the capital of France? paris
What is the name of the remains of plants and animals that are found in stone? fossils
What is the last name of the man who rode horseback in 1775 to warn that the 
British were coming? revere
What kind of metal is associated with a 50th wedding anniversary? gold
What is the name of the thick layer of fat on a whale? blubber
For which country is the Yen the monetary unit? japan
What is the word that means a nautical mile per hour? knot
In which game are men crowned? checkers
What is the name of the legendary one-eyed giant in Greek mythology? cyclops
What is the longest river in South America? amazon
What animal runs the fastest? cheetah
What is the name of the extinct reptiles known as "terrible lizards"? dinosaurs
Of which country is Buenos Aires the capital? argentina
What is the last name of the man who invented the phonograph? edison
Of which country is Nairobi the capital? kenya
What Italian city was destroyed when Mount Vesuvius erupted in 79 A.D.? pompeii
What is the last name of the author who wrote "Brave New World?" huxley
What is the only word the raven says in Edgar Allen Poe's poem "The Raven?" nevermore
Which sport uses the terms "stones" and "brooms"? curling
What was the name of the Apollo lunar module that landed the first man on 
the moon? eagle
In which city is Michelangelo's statue of David located? florence
Over which river is the George Washington Bridge? hudson
The general named Hannibal was from what city? carthage
What is the last name of the union general who defeated the confederate army 
at the civil war battle of Gettysburg? meade
10 Question Test: Question Answer
What is the name of the comic strip character who eats spinach to increase his 
strength? popeye
What is the name of the remains of plants and animals that are found in stone? fossils
What is the name of the bird that cannot fly and is the largest bird on Earth? ostrich
What is the word that means a nautical mile per hour? knot
What is the name of deer meat? venison
What is the last name of the man who invented the phonograph? edison
What is the last name of the man who wrote "Canterbury Tales?" chaucer
Which sport uses the terms "stones" and "brooms"? curling
What is the last name of the artist who painted "Guernica?" picasso
What is the last name of the union general who defeated the confederate army 
at the civil war battle of Gettysburg? meade
3 Question Test: Question Answer
What is the name of the comic strip character who eats spinach to increase 
his strength? popeye
What is the last name of the author who wrote "The Old Man and the Sea"? hemmingway
What is the last name of the union general who defeated the confederate 
army at the civil war battle of Gettysburg? meade
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Appendix C
Table C1. Examples of each self-reported strategy from Experiment 3.
Strategy Type Example
Impression/Guess ”I feel like I may have gotten more right than 
wrong, but probably not by a large margin.”
Retrospective Tally “I could not remember the Union general, I 
think the Confederate general was either Robert 
E. Lee. I think it was possibly Stonewall Jackson. 
I also had no clue who wrote that book, so I just 
guessed using popular authors at this time. I am 
confident of my last answer.”
On-line Tally "Tried to keep track a long the way.”
Irrelevant/Vague “I like history and trivia.”
Other "I knew I'd gotten all the answers right.”
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Appendix D
Supplementary Analyses
Experiment 1a-d Confidence Ratings
In Experiments 1b and 1d, after each question subjects recalled, we 
asked how confident they were that they had answered that question correctly. 
Perhaps subjects who take an Easy-Hard test are traditionally more optimistic 
about their performance because they are confident about the questions they 
can recall; by contrast, perhaps Hard-Easy people do the opposite, and are less 
confident about the questions they can recall—regardless of when they 
appeared on the test. But we found no evidence for this proposition. In fact, we 
found evidence that points in the opposite direction. In Experiment 1b, Easy-
Hard subjects (M = 3.35, SD = 1.80) were less confident that they had answered 
the questions they recalled correctly than Hard-Easy subjects, (M = 3.97, SD = 
1.54; Mdiff = 0.62 95% CI [-0.69, 1.94]. In NHST terms, there was a nonsignificant 
trend for Easy-Hard subjects to be less confident than Hard-Easy subjects t(27) 
= 0.97, p = 0.34. In Experiment 1d, Easy-Hard subjects (M = 3.85, SD = 1.52) 
were again less confident than Hard-Easy subjects (M = 4.42, SD = 1.25; Mdiff = 
0.57 95% CI [-0.22, 1.37]. In NHST terms, there was again a nonsignificant trend 
for Easy-Hard subjects to be less confident than Hard-Easy subjects t(48) = 1.43, 
p = 0.16.
Experiment 2 Time Spent on the Test
The order of questions on the test hardly affected how long subjects took 
to take the test, Mdiff = 3.59 seconds, 95% CI [-51.48, 58.66]. In NHST terms, the 
difference between the average time subjects spent on each question was 
nonsignificant t(443) < 1. 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Appendix E
Table E1. Information about the subjects in each experiment.
Experiment Condition Males Females Mean Age (SD)
1a Easy-Hard 11 14 33.89 (13.06)
Hard-Easy 10 14 31.15 (8.88)
1b Easy-Hard 9 9 31.63 (8.27)
Hard-Easy 6 6 32.26 (10.50)
1c Easy-Hard 15 9 28.72 (11.21)
Hard-Easy 14 9 37.83 (11.88)
1d Easy-Hard 17 15 32.33 (11.62)
Hard-Easy 14 10 34.83 (12.18)
2 Easy-Hard, No Recall 48 42 30.50 (10.05)
Easy-Hard, Recall 50 47 30.30 (10.43)
Hard-Easy, No Recall 40 41 32.70 (12.86)
Hard-Easy, Recall 49 41 32.00 (10.47)
3 Easy-Hard, 3 19 24 30.07 (10.45)
Hard-Easy, 3 20 19 30.44 (11.22)
Easy-Hard, 10 27 23 30.68 (10.08)
Hard-Easy, 10 18 22 31.50 (9.75)
Easy-Hard, 25 18 24 29.88 (10.82)
Hard-Easy, 25 18 19 31.68 (13.95)
Easy-Hard, 50 17 18 31.63 (9.96)
Hard-Easy, 50 16 17 31.94 (10.49)
4 Easy-Hard, Warning 42 46 29.91 (12.63)
Easy-Hard, No Warning 43 66 26.62 (10.30)
Hard-Easy, Warning 38 52 27.56 (12.05)
Hard-Easy, No Warning 31 54 30.01 (13.45)
5 Easy-Hard, Warning 18 26 34.59 (12.87)
Easy-Hard, No Warning 23 19 30.60 (10.74)
Hard-Easy, Warning 18 19 30.22 (10.68)
Hard-Easy, No Warning 18 21 31.54 (12.53)
